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Economic Analysis. Political Economy and Camerounian
Development
Professor Francois Perroux observed in conversation 
during a 1961 economic seminar in Tunis that human 
nature and aspirations as well as technical and economic 
principles are everywhere basically the same. It is 
specific institutions and histories as well as the 
particular environmental problems and economic structural 
patterns which vary widely.
That preposition has very definite implications in 
regard to the nature and relevance of economic analysis 
and political economic formulation designed to elucidate 
and assist in the task of overcoming the problems of 
development. This study can best be summarized as an 
effort to begin such analysis and formulation in the 
context of the economy and the development of the 
Cameroun Federal Republic.
The possibility, usefulness, and interest of 
applying modern economic analysis to developing economies 
has been challenged on a variety of counts.** Certainly 
the structural nature of economies with poorly developed 
internal linkages, limited secondary sectors, and heavy 
external dependence requires thought as to the selection 
and use of analytical tools and, even more, careful 
scrutiny ©f implicit assumptions. Equally the limited 
and fragile nature of the statistical base renders many 
sophisticated methodologies and elegant models non- 
©perational or - when fed with quite inappropriate 
materials - counter-productive.
However, the evidence of parallel studies in other 
African economies* is in support of four contentions 
underlying the analytical approach of this study:
1) The Cameroun economy is an entity both worthy of and 
susceptible to economic study in its own right not 
mere treatment as a peripheral segment of the world 
(or franc cone) economy nor simple verbal description;
* See, e.g. Tony Killick, E.N. Omab©e, and R. Szereszewsk; 
in Birmingham, ITeustadt, and Omaboe (Editors), The 
Economy of Ghana. Allen and Unwin, London, 1966.
Admitedly both the array of statistical information and 
the body of previous economic studies is larger for Ghan, 
than for the Cameroun Federal Republic.
** See Hla Myint “c.conomic Theory and Underdeveloped Countrj 
Journal of Political Economy. October 1965, and Dudley 
Seers, "The limitations of the Special case” Bulletin of 
the Institute of Economics and Statistics. Oxford. May 
1965 for a fuller presencation and evaluation of these criticisms.
INTRODUCTION
.
This study flows from the context of seven years 
of research and thinking on the economies, apportunities 
for and obstacles to economic development, and socio­
political aspirations of the economically small, per 
capita income deficient, primary export dependent 
economies of Africa and South East Asia. Over half 
of that period has been spent in Africa, the rest at the 
Economic Growth Center and Economies Department of Yale 
University and in South East Asia.
The analytical approach and line of argument 
developed in this study have been greatly influenced 
by the writings of - and personal discussion with, albeit 
briefly in two cases - Professors U Hla Myint, now of 
the University of London, Francois per roux of the College 
de France, and especially Dudley Seers then of the Yale 
Growth Center and now of the University of Sussex. They 
have also been tested and modified in long and often 
spirited dialogues with Drs. Brian Van Arkadie and 
S.H. Hymer of Yale University, Frederick Clarimante 
of the Economic Commission for Africa, and Mr. G.B. Kay 
of the City University, London. None of the above, 
like those cited below who have assisted in providing 
materials for and comments on this study should be held 
responsible for the views, conclusions, aberrations 
or errors of the author.
Thanks are due to many officials, advisors, and 
citizens of the Comeroun Federal and State Governments, 
to members of the staff of ECA and of the Organization 
Commune Africaine et Malagasy and to United States 
Congressman Jed Johnson, Jr. and the Library of Congress 
for their generous assistance in providing access to 
written, and in taking time to give oral, information 
and comments. They should also go to the Economic 
Growth Center of Yale University for a grant enabling 
the author to travel to the Cameroun Federal Republic 
in 1965*
Special debts are owed to Jean Claude Bourellis and 
Robert Gurney who undertook the laborious translation of 
the study into French and to Beth Esther Rhnde whose 
abiding faith in the author was a constant challenge 
and stimulus to completing the study at times when this 
appeared in doubt.
Reginald Herbold Green 
East African Institute of 
Social Research,
Kampala, Uganda
August, 1966.
2) Modern macro-economic and sectoral techniques 
of presentation and of demonstration of economic 
relationships are both theoretically relevant 
and practically applicable to the Cameroun economy;
3) Particular facets of the Cameroun economy and of 
both Camerounian and Franco-Camerounian economic 
policy can be studied with greater effectiveness 
within such a macro-sectoral quantitative framework;
4) Despite the limitations of Camerounian statistics, 
their full and imaginative use does provide the 
base for quantitative presentation of most critical 
magnitudes, relationships and rates of change;
5) Such an approach is the most effective means of
testing - and in most cases rejecting or drastically 
modifying - the host of stock assumptions about 
the orational or unique nature of African economies 
and the economic responses of Africans, The well 
worn "conventional wisdom" of backbending supply 
curves, undifferentiated labour force pattens, 
negligible non-external trade related monetized co­
nsumption, dominance of food and of self-produced 
items in consumption patterns, absence of capital 
in agriculture can only be challeged by empirical 
presentation of the actual situation. In the case 
of the Cameroun, none appears to survive such 
scrutiny.
The central concern of economic policy and under­
standing - and therefore logically of economic analysis - 
in Africa is that of economic growth and change. One of 
the most effective ways of regarding this process, whether 
historically or in terms of projections, pedagogically or 
as a guide to policy formulation, is that of formulating 
and analysing the structure of the economy and its 
alteration over time.*
* Per fuller presentations of the structural approach 
to development analysis and strategy see: Francois 
Perroux, L 1 Economic Des Jeunes Nations. Presses 
Universitaires de Prance, Paris, 1962; Gustav Ranis, 
"Planning for Resources and Planning for Strategy Change", 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Heft 1, 1965; R. Szereszewski
Structural Changes In the Economy Of Ghana 1891-1911. 
Weidenfela and Kicolson, London, 19^^ J I)udiey Seers,
"The Stages of Economic Development of a primary producer 
in the Middle of the Twentieth Century", Economic Bulletin 
of Ghana, 1963t No.4; and R.H. Green Stages In Economic 
Development t Changes In The Structure of Production. 
Demand, and International Trade, Bank o$ 'Fhe Sudan, 
Khartuum, 1966.
TABLE XI - A - 1
GROWTH PROJECTIONS 1962/63 - 1975
A. EAST CAMERQUN - VALUE ADDED (/OOO.OOO) ’ : -
• ’ • •; * • />
I
Primary :
1 ( 3
Secondary
Const- 1
Tertiary | Production I 
....
Mining Industry Energy ruction Total I Transport Total j Total Growth
1962-63 201.7 0 36.5 4.1 18.2 58.8 23,9
. r ) 
185.9 | 446.4 )
1965 210.9 I 0 51.3 4.4 20.9 76.6 1 42,9 229.7 j 517.2 )
1970 2 6 6 . 8 5 1 0 1 . 0 5.3 31.0 142.3 j 60.7 350 .2 I 759,3 ) 7.8 Jo
1975 321.5 25 198.8 6.4 46.4 276.6 j 85.9 533.9 !11132.0 )
Change 1962/62/1975 119.8 25 162.3 2.3. 28.2 217.8 6 2 . 0 348.0 j 665.6
•
% 1962-63 45.2 0 8 . 2 •9 4.1 13.2 ; 5.3 41.6 100
i
!
% 1975 28.4L i ~ 2-? _ 17.6 . 6. . .... 4.1 24.4 ! 7.6 47.2 100 .. .....i
'•> B. EAST CAMEROUt'i SECTORAL GROWTH RATES
Primary 1 Secondary Const­
Tertiary
fcT
Minina Industry Energy ruction Total Transport Total | G.D.P.
1959/1962-63
, -----—
2.4 . 18.6 4.7 7.4 18.6 - 26.4 . 11.5 | '7.4
1960-1965 1 . 8 - 14.5 3.6 5.7 14.5 26.4 8 . 8 6.7
1965-1970 3.8 - 14.5 3.6 1.1 16.7 26.4 8 . 8 8 . 0
1970-1975 | 3.8 ...3.?. .. l.. }A.:1 ... 3.6 7,7 16.0 26.4 8 . 8 .8.3
C. FEDERAL CAMERGUd - VALUE ADDED (/000,000) D. FEDERAL CAMERCUN G.D.P. (/OOO,000)^^
East Dest^j Total East West Total
1962-63 446.2 6 6 . 0 i 512.2 1962-63 498.5 70.9 569.4
1965 517.2 89.7 606.9 1965 478.4 96.2 574.6
1970 759.3 117.2 876.5 1970 843.7 130.4 974.1
1975 1,132.0 168.6 j 1,300.6 1975 \ 1,257.8 187.3 1,445.0
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The Setting; Geographic.
The area of the Cameroun Republic is 475,000 square kilometers 
with its 640 km (425 mile) base at 2°N and irregularly narrowing to a 
point offshore in Lake Chad at 13°N 1,050 km (7Q0 mile) away. About 
60% of the area lips in a roughly 400 by 640 km nfawfh quadrilateral at 
the base and the rest in a 700 km long triangle rendered irregular by 
the westward projection of Chad between the Logone and Maya Krebi rivers.
. . , . . • | _ I f ' *
In the southern quadrilateral the main rivers are the Sanaga,
Wowi and Nyang all major potential power sources (actual for the Sanaga 
at Edeci) at several points on their courses but of limited use for 
navigation. In the north the Logone drains into Lake Chad while the 
Maya Krebi-Benoue system leading through Nigeria to the sea is navig­
able to Garoua for six weeks (July 15 - September 15). Douala is the 
major eastern and Victoria-Bota-Tiko the major western p^rts.
-v f^q^yarj
Five geographic zones can be distinguished in the
Federal Republic:
(a) the mountain area of the south and west running from
Mount Cameroun (4,070 metres) through the Manengouba,
Bambouta and Mbam massifs (including most of the ^amenda,
Mambilla, and Bamileke uplands) and north into the Mandara 
hills near the BeUoue; (ft)
(b) the coastal forest plain, a hot humid belt of 15 to 80 km
between the coast and the forest plateau;
(c) the forested central plateau rising precipitously from the
plain to an altitude of 500-700 m. and extending from the 
base 300-400 km north at which distance the tropical rain j\ zont
forest merges into savannah and the plateau4(is interrupted 
by the Adamawa highlands - an extension of the mountain 
system;
the 80-200 km deep (N-8 ) Adamoua zone of savannah scrub, 
bush, and grass with an average elevation of 1 2 0 0 m. and a 
dry temperate continental climate;
the northern scrub-grass plateau stretching;to Lake Chad 
and marked by increasing^ heat and aridity as it progresses 
toward the Sahara^ he C K a-J
-  U  p t t y U U  -p-*- a.r iky
Demographic Features . n n n * i r w v  u c) S.
t e.-f v nno**
The population of the Federal Republic'~MBfc~ between 4.25 and 
6 million. No complete census has been taken and "official” and "semi­
official" estimates^even from the same source}vary widely e.g. a 1961 
UN Statistical Bulletin figure of 4.9 million and a 1965 ECAFE estimate 
of 4.3J' Between 20 and 25% of the population is Cameroun Occidental 
(10% of the area), and between 75 and 80% in Cameroun 
Oriental. On the whole a population figure of 5 million - basecborr- ttsfc 
ECA estimatesH^tre-adgrrsrted for under reporting especially of children- 
seems the best working hypothesis.
No one tribal group is numerically dominant in the Cameroun.
Political power rests in the hands of the interior savannah populations 
in both states. Economically the Bassa, Beti-Pahouin (Yaounde area),
-^0 and - above all - the Bamileke. ..Over 100,000 Bamileke are migrants 
especially^ti» Yaounde and Douala where they are coming to dominate 
African commercial, and, increasingly, public sector posts.
Urbanization is limited (8*§f() and largely a product of the 
modern economy not the pre-colonial society. 3^|j-^$O,000 Camerounians
?S‘- ,o0>OC
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are in cities of pver ©vwr 10,000'!#.with Douala (130-
150,000), Yaounde (7^-60,000) and the Victoria-Buea-Tiko combination 
(to -60,000) the largest. For the country as a whole population density 
is less than 10/km. However, for the West Cameroun the density exceeds
20/km. The range by department is from over 100/km in Wouri (which 
includes Douala) to .6/km in Boumba Ngaro in the northeast. In certain 
of the south and western highlands - especially the Bamileke - population 
density and land tenure patterns have combined both to encourage migra­
tion and to create growing discontent. »
With a crude birth rate estimated in the low or middle 40's 
relatively low for West and Central Africa - and a life expectancy in 
the low or middle 30's, the Cameroun population structure is 40% under 
15, 54-|% 15-59, and 54% 60 and over. The rate of population growth, 
has been variously estimated from 1 . 0 to 2 .1%, the latter appearing in
<xthe interim pi standards are
2-2.25% presera , it , .
popui * 4 ; A^Pitr If 7o P r o L c ^ k U
Historico-Economic Notes
an report. Considering that Cameroun nutrition, and health 
 comparable to Nigeria's and the low.birth rate,, doubtful a c t y ^  0 7 
sent rate rising to 2.5 by^  1 9 7 0 Jinrn;#. ‘
The Camerouns1 first sustained contacts with the world economy 
came in the early sixteenth century with the emergence of the slave trade.
For three centuries the Gulf of Biafra was a major source of supply both 
to the plantations of the New World and to those of the offshore Gulf 
Islands which also served as bases and collecting points for the traffic. 
Trans-Saharan trade via Kano, Agades, and Darfur - pxobably including 
east bound slaves - was much older than the coastal contact with Europe 
but its lasting impact has been on the Islamic socio-political patterns 
of the North not on the growth of the economy. Pii^rirr-i -fa M t  CCA. a . J
Ine**) A/ ik4 I-, J £ *.*4 cr*zi 4 k &?<>•£ 4 Kc.i
Following the post 1825 collapse of the slave trade the Douala- 
Victoria areas languished. British, French, and German missionary and
trading interests sought to interest their governments in acguiring the £ y 4 n (1
coast with Germany acting in 1884 one week ahead of the United Kingdom. . , \
German rule to 1914 saw the "protectorate" extended to Lake Chad, p®rt ) ' } 1
v facilities established principally at Douala and Victoria, ^railroads 
built from Douala to Nktngsamba and almost to Yaounde^^JiK the narrow 
gauge Viet<M?4a Plantation line, administrative and commercial buildings
*7 .
Jconstructed in the major centres. Equally a framework of administration 
and of education were set up as were the plantations and the initial
small farmer crops which have sustained the modern sector of the Cameroon 
economy. The price of German colonial efficiency was repressive rule, 
forced labour, and brutal suppression of revolts (especially in the 
Bamileke Country). . (*0*> -*
The Cameroun mm mandated! .to the U.K. e w  - about half of  ^p ^  *
which represent the present Cameroui^ Occidental, the other - northern -
portion having voted in 1961 to join Nigeria) and to France/v As noted £)/,*•-4*' ■
earlier France pursued the Sarrant "rriise en valeur" policy vigorously 
marking up a fine bold trade increase for 1922-1938. French plantations - 
while still dominant in rubber and palm oil - decreased in overall 
importance many failing in the 1930's. The price of this policy - 
including public works maintenance and road construction - was high poll 
0  taxes (to force cash crop production) and forced labour (for public works 
and, to a limited extent, private plantations).
The British administration - responsible to Lagos unlike the 
French which reported direct to Paris - remained passive. West Camer­
ounian bitterness at British inaction Was expressed in the 1961 vote to 
join the Federal Republic not Nigeria and has be;en increased by what are 
regarded as niggardly aid provision and retaliatory increases in tariff 
barriers (especially on bananas). T b t  t .  C  C  C#*\0 11 Cta 11 4 1
4k. w<. C*. rvw -
t d e c  F c  0 4. f\,     ^
» F
$>L
JW  ^  « \ t. £  * 4 4 t f *V i f (f
5 v f f  ** + - U *
$ rr*. K II -l» *t iij
J 4 ♦vfc P U * \ 4 ^ V i d ~  /-
Camerounian self government Per - i ✓ty serious thought only 
Vj after the succession of UN Trusteeship for League Mandates in 1946.
Rapid advance to independence (as opposed to. semi-autonomous associa­
tion) probably begins as recently as President Ahidjo's accession to 
power as Prime Minister in 1958. Independent on January 1, I960, the 
Cemeroun Republic concentrated on securing the adhesion of the West 
and North (British) Camerouns. In October 1961 the former voted for 
union in the Federal Republic, the latter for continuation of its status 
as a Northern Nigerian Province.
v
■s*
Political Patterns*
Camerounian politics are integral to an understanding of 
Camerounian economic policy and of certain of the barriers to develop­
ment. As in almost all Francophanic African states political power 
leads to the good life and to success in economic activity much more 
often than the reverse. Further concern for breaking the circle of 
limited resources - limited output and growth - limited resources is 
seen to lie in a strong centralized state. Thus whether on the individu 
dual, the communal, or the national level economic concern is seen to 
lead logically to the primacy of politics.
„...... . i <
Today the Cameroun Federal Republic is a one party state 
(viewing Vice President John Foncha's Western Kamerun National Demo- 
&xa±iGj?a£ty as de facto a branch of the Union Camerounais) with one 
dominant leader:- President Ahmedu Ahidjo. A one party state has been 
created partly because those in power cannot afford to lose its fruits 
and the (many) "carpet-crossers" are unable to resist accepting a share 
but also because, in the absence of an extensive skilled buresucracy, 
the parti unique is seen as means to using less technically trained men 
to further national union both by appeals to Camerounian solidarity and 
distribution of benefits.
Ucam is the survivor of three political.tendencies. It was a 
party of the Northern "new modern elite" - the young men (perhaps in 
their 30’s and with six to ten years of school) who were junior officials, 
small merchants, primary teachers, shop assistants and,as such,opposed to the 
"traditional elite" (hereditary rulers and favoured French appointees to 
middle official posts). It was in no sense radical-Islamic, bourgoise, 
and nationalist are adjectives which come to mind.
In the South the "old modern elite" of officials, teachers, 
merchants and intellectuals formed a bevy of parties some regional, some 
semi-confessional, some, personal. These were determined to guard them­
selves against the "new elites" of both the North and South and were 
eager allies of the French administration. IsOnce Ahidjo assumed power, 
they tended to splinter with increasing numbers joining Ucam but never 
able to play a dominant (or probably even major) role in it. The 
remnants at last (1962) allied themselves with the third (radical) 
remnants and were suppressed with them.
The Union des Peuples Camerounais (UPC) was also a "new modern 
elite" party but its hard core lay in the Bamileke and Bassa cash crop 
farmers (who opposed official and traditional tenure and exaction patterns)
For a similar but more detailed analysis of the elite political 
pattern in Francophonic Africa cf Immanuel Wallerstein "Elites in 
French-speaking West Africa % the Social Base of Ideas" Imas 3-1, 
1965. ) okj r r\ <x.| o P M  & j <l r r* A  f - I c
'—  )
e 7 /Vo. I I 9 t S~,
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and the urban workers and smaller merchants (often Bamileke migrants).. 
Inherently'radidal in aims,the UPC was suppressed by the French leading 
to a revolution more or less duelled by I960 but still leaving a live 
heritage of rural violence and repression today. The UPC also split by 
I960 with the majority of its middle level leaders joining Ucam, some 
temporarily serving as a "loyal opposition", and others maintaining a 
militant revolutionary position at home or in exile. Since I960 the 
role of the Ucam joiners has been gradually eroded and the "loyal 
opposition" pushed first into union with the Southern "old elite" 
remnants and then forcibly suppressed.
The Cameroun political pattern is one of. a semi-open elite 
with political power concentrated in Northern hands but civil service 
and technical positions held largely by expatriates or Southern Camer­
ounians (especially Bamileke). Political loyalty is a prerequisite for 
public employment (non-KNDP/Ucam civil servants were removed in the 
spring of 196b); ability is, however, apparently critical in promotion.
_ — ^
Control by a Northern party and by one not the original French 
backed "parti d'administration" (albeit not the mass nationalist movement 
either) has influenced Camerounian politico-economic decisions. Tech­
nically and educationally weak, vis a vis the South, Ucam's Northern 
leaders have been forced to rely on Southern civil servants using both 
political means (e.g. breaking alternative Southern parties) and a 
continued French technocratic presence to maintain control. Coming from 
a poor area with few opportunities for economic advance Ucam's leaders 
are deeply committed to retaining office and to making political power 
yield personal economic gain. At the same time they wish to see their 
area catch up, a goal relevant to Transcam and road construction and 
education-health expansion.
As both a modernizing and-increasingly - a national elite,
Ucam has pursued policies of building Cameroun oriented elites through­
out the country and of seeking to increase freedom of maneuvre vis a 
vis France through broader foreign contacts and the Central African 
Regionalism formalized in UDEAC. In the South Cameroun the policy of 
loyal modern elite education and employment has been paralleled by 
reinforcing particularist local notables as a short run measure with a 
resultant need to use continued repression of dissidence tracing back to 
the UPC rebellion. In the West a much more permissive line has been 
followed and the new civil service and educational elite are, in fact, 
enthusiastic Camerounian Federal nationalists. Internationally, the 
Cameroun is distinctly limited in her freedom of choice by a series of 
dependencies on France and EEC - e.g. 80% of state investment is foreign 
aid and $)0% of that comes from FAC (French aid) and FED (EEC's European 
Development Fund). Regionally she faces some difficulties in that 
Camerounian dominance of UDEAC is seen as a potential danger by all the 
other members and, more seriously, Congo (Brazza) interests are almost 
certain to be injured by the combination of UDEAC and the Transcam's 
making Douala not Brazzaville the regional centre of gravity.
U t f C
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III. Structural Patterns in the Cameroun Economy; 
Production. Consumption. Capital Institutions
At first glance, the Camerounian economic structure appears to vali­
date the standard comments on low output per capita economies. The primary 
sector is large, manufacturing is small, a high proportion of output goes 
directly to final users, intersectoral linkages are limited, imports and 
exports play a central role, a substantial portion of output-consumption is 
v own use production in food ’’"However, on closer examination
this rather simpliste formulation is seen to be inadequate, not so much because 
its elements are untrue as because they are incomplete and over-aggregated.,
ix.A ^ yt^ ^r*^ ; .%■ ^ ^ ^  ^ ^  ^  ihc**J
Capital - both "modern" and "direct labour investment" -is far from 
negligible, indeed the% ratio of over 2.5 is not particularly low. Primary 
sector value added has fallen below half of production and barely exceeds two 
fifths of produit, while the secondary sector is now at least an eighth of 
production and a ninth of produit. Including government, at least half of the 
service sector is basically modern in value added,jnot employment terms)% . 
vVhile exports plus imports are slightly under half of G.D.P., exports rep­
resent less than one third of estimated commercialized G.D.P.*» J O  ft \ >
S t O' _ L y
-Intermediate consumption of goods and services - an approximation 
of input-output intermediate transactions including those within sectors - is 
substantially over one third of total production giving a final to total trans­
actions ratio of under 75%. In the case of the secondary sector, the ratio is 
about 35% giving a total to final transactions ratio of about 2.7:1.
Nonr-commercialized production has fallen rapidly as a share of G.D.P. 
from about 40% in <1*951 to 31.5% in 1959 and 26.5% in 1962-63. Only in domestic 
food (e.g. 60%), construction (30%) and domestic fuel and power (70% - fire­
wood and charcoal) it is significant. Even in these sectors there is some 
reason to suspect the non-commercialized share is over-estimated because local 
rural sales of food and firewood among farmers and the use of hired labour and 
traditional construction craftsmen j^s'TfncTer-estirnated. ' a 1 ■ • .
Equally significant the "non-commercialized sector" does not 
represent a non-commercialized enclave either in a population or a geographic 
sense. The typical family unit which is a self-use producer of food, firewood 
and t a W ) £ s  normally also a commercial producer of domestic and/or export 
cash crops (including livestock) and often of commercial services (e.g. f * r >,C 
trading), craft products, and wage labour. It is distinctly unlikely that 
more than 10% of the population can properly be described as outside the 
commercial economy (under 10-15% cash to total unit income). Only in the 
extreme North and some of the more isolated hill areas would this segment 
approach a majority of the population.* r
Given this pattern, it is not self-evident that comparisons with 
commercialized product are necessarily more revealing than with total product 
so far as the Cameroun is concerned. To the extent that self-use production 
represents only a part of any class of production or consumption^.it is possible 
to shift income use patterns substantially in response to tax or price changes 
without running into the "non-transferability" barriers normally associated 
with '"semi-subsistence" economies.
A constraint does exist in regard to "direct labour investment" - 
especially in tree crops, although a significant proportion of the labour is 
probably hired rather than self or family - a sector on which no flow data 
are available. A major aim of the - to date only marginally successful (see 
Section VI) - investissment humain programme was to raise the volume of this
* This is not to minimise the problem or challenge this group presents.
Especially in the Chari-Logone^Chad^area they have the lowest non­
commercial incomes per head and most deficient diets as well as little 
cash income beyond that needed for tax, salt, and rather limited clothing.
investment flow while increasing the range of uses to which it could be put.
Again such investment - which is dominantly directed toward commercial pro­
duction - is not a "problem" flowing from a "subsistence" economy but an 
active response to commercial economy possibilities subject to technological 
and transferability constraints whose relaxation represents the genuine 
problem. TK K 11 (t\ / 1 v j
CfeVk pt -V I'**. 4 bttrfv . 1*4, C tXV 1C* f\t*i «| f />
Data have been prepared on "modern" and "traditional" production but 
these are of yv* ' limited usefulness because the definition of traditional 
de facto includes all African farmers (even fertilizer and insecticide using 
tree crop or cotton growers) and virtually all African craft and repair units 
(again apparently without regard to whether power, material use and technology 
show a pattern of stability or change). Food farming - including that for cash 
sale - along with livestock production and fishing remain non-modern in the 
sense o ^ ba sically static a*# applying only limited innovations partly or 
largely because appropriate new techniques, tools, pesticides and fertilizers 
are either not developed, not demonstrated or not financially available. Tree 
j:rop, cotton and tobacco production represents a clear shift in technology 
employed (including a high % ratio especially in the tree crop case).*
A similar - but less easily definable - division almost certainly exists in 
both small scale secondary and tertiary production. Local beer and spirit 
brewing shows no discernable signs of modernization but construction, fur­
niture making and carpentry do; small scale market trading remains basically 
unchanged (albeit on its present scale it is a response both to the expansion 
of the commercial economy and to its unsatisfactory employment opportunity 
pattern especially for women) but transport, medium scale (including rural to 
urban wholesale food trade) commerce and tailoring are much more dynamic*
4 C l\*\\ W " f i 9 ^  ^  S I ,
Gross Domestic Product by Sector
Gross domestic product in 1962-63 was 142.7 million CFA ($578 million) 
and 28,540 CFA ($116) per capita. In the East it was 123.1 million CFA and 
32,800 CFA per capita, and in the West 19.6 million CFA and 15,700 CFA per 
capita. 1965 Federal estimates are 165.7 million CFA ($671 million) and 31,560 
CFA ($128) per capita with the inter-state disparity slightly wider both abso­
lutely and proportionately. i—
In 1962-63 the primary sector (approximately 80% agriculture, 11% 
livestock and fishery, 9% forestry) accounted for 43% of G.D.P. Its share 
had fallen steadily from 60% in 1951, a fall which continued to 39% in 1965.
The secondary sector (approximately 63% industry and crafts, 30% 
construction and 7% power**) accounted for 11% of G.D.P. in 1962-63 and 13% 
in 1965. Its share has steadily risen from 7% in 1951. Tertiary production 
(74% commerce, 13% transport and 13% other - excluding government and domestic) 
generated 36% of the 1962-63 and 38% of the 1965 G.D.P. versus a 1951 propor­
tion of 27%.
Production declined from 95% of produit (G.D.P) in 1951 to 90% in 
1962-63 a«d 1965 largely because of a fourfold rise in government labour bill
Examination of rural development patterns in both Africa and Southeast 
Asia casts severe doubt on willful stubbornness as the chief cause of 
- continued non-modern production 'and even greater doubt on the approp­
riateness and viability of many of the techniques and innovations proposed 
by agricultural services. The Camerounian case does not appear to be an 
exception. For,a fuller exposition (including reference to East African 
and Southeast Asian experience) see R.H. Green and S'.H. Hymer, "Cocoa 
in the Gold Coast ; A Study in the Relations between African Farmers and 
Agricultural Experts", Economic History Review. 1966. $ f (,-j <■
These figures are for 1962-63. In earlier years the industry and crafts 
share was smaller and construction larger.
rt.
from 1951 to 1962-63 (in that year government labour bill was 86% and domestic 
service 14%.of this sector). However, the change in share came prior to 1957 
with the "non-production" share in G.D.P. basically constant thereafter.
East Cameroun results dominate Federal but show distinctly lower 
primary sector G.D.P. generation shares, distinctly higher tertiary and general 
government, and since 1959 higher secondary^ p f o f oc  ^o n
'West Cameroun data show very substantially higher pri«ary sector 
G.D.P. generation shares - 58% in 1962-63 and 66% in 1951—as well as much less 
shift in the pattern of G.D.P. MmiMSys&y'"tertiary production has risen from 
22% to 28%, secondary was 1% (then parallel to Eastern) in 1951 and again in 
1962-63, although this in part represented a post-1959 construction slump and 
the 1965 share may have been 11-12%. "Non-production" parallel at 5% in 1951 
rose only to Q% in 1962-63 with at most a threefold rise in government labour 
bill. Movements in the West Cameroun data are harder to isolate in detail because 
V  the series are less accurate and not fully comparable over time.* However, the 
y' greater primary sector dependence, lower levels of government labour bill, per 
capital and relative sluggishness of structural change when contrasted to the 
East Cameroun are clear and are confirmed by sectoral and micro-data, e.g. on 
government expenditure, employment and secondary production.
V C k r w -> c r.oy
Overall the^G.D.P. makeup has shifted toward a more "modern" and 
economically advanced' structure. The ratio of intermediate to final trans- 
actions has risen as has that of commercialized to total production. The share 
of secondary production has virtually doubled, and that of total government 
\  more than, doubled, while primary production has fallen from three fifths to 
.: under two fifths.
Labour force-G.D.P. relationships must be posited tentatively because 
of the extreme fragility of the labour force data (see Section IX). They 
appear to show a lesser degree of change than do output data, a perfectly 
plausible result in that productivity per man is probably virtually static 
in domestic food production (including livestock and fisheries).
The primary sector utilized 69% of the labour force in 1962-63 (71% 
in 1959) giving a ratio of .62 (.68 in 1959) of average sectoral to overall 
national productivity. For the secondary sector the labour force share was 
10% in 1962-63 (9% in 1959) giving a ratio of 1.1 (l.l in 1959). However, 
this ratio is heavily depressed by the craft and rural construction elements 
which dominate labour force utilized but not value addedv** For manufacturing 
the ratio is perhaps 3.0 and for "modern" construction 2.5. The tertiary 
> sector with 18% of the labour force (17% in 1959) has a ratio of 2.0 (1.9 in 
o'—  1959) with finance, transport and large scale commerce probably averaging 3.0 
or above and small scale commerce less than 1. Government employment has a 
2.4% (2.1% in 1959) share in the labour force and a 3.8^ 1 (3.91 in 1959 possibly 
because of the higher proportion of expatriates in this salary dominated sector) 
ratio of sectoral to national output per labour force member.
The relationship of exports and imports to G.D.P. has not c ' "*■
>5 * For Cameroun Federale and Orientale three periods - 1951-57,
1957-59 and 1959-1962/3 - can be isolated, while for the West Cameroun 
1951-60 and 1960-62/3 show different trends.
See Note 3, Table III-A-1.
The Coroptes Economiaues probably both under-estimates "craft" value added 
and classify much of it, e.g. rural brewing and distilling and small 
scale food and vegetable oil processing, in the primary sector. These 
factors might raise secondary sector product to 15-17% and the overall 
sectoral labour force output ratio to 1.5-1.7.
0£>
£*)
From 1951 to 1957 both exports and imports (which exceeded exports 
by over 30% in the initial and 20% in the terminal year) fell as'a per cent
of G.D.P. with the import share decline - 25.6% to 21.7% - more marked than
that of exports - 19.5% to 18.6%. Both fell sharply as a share of commer­
cialized product - 37.2% to 29.1% for exports and 49.2% to 34.1% for imports,-^)
•Jhfc U l l v  rv*-' Ar Ittf ^ r t w  A. ^ i) A-' /%.
From 1957 to 1959 (with the completion of the Edea smelter and 
both quantity and price gains for agricultural exports) exports rose to 28.5% 
of G.D.P. and imports to 23.3% (a normal export surplus now having reappeared 
for the first time since the 1930's). As a per cent of commercialized G.D.P. 
exports rose to 41.6 while imports remained constant at 34.1%.
I
From 1959 to 1962/3 the slow growth (negative until 1962/3) of 
exports and a resultant slowing of import growth resulted in falls to 22.2% 
for exports (distinctly above 19511s 19.5%) and to 21.3% for imports (dis­
tinctly below the 25.6% of 1951 and marginally below the 21.7% 1957 share).
Exports stood at 30.2% and imports at 29% of commercialized product (well 
below their respective 37.2% and 49.2% levels of 1951, and for imports well 
below the 34.1% of 1957 but for exports marginally above that year's 29.1%).
For the west Cameroun, exports rose from circa 25% in 1951 to 33% VCin I960 before declining to 22% by 1962-63 (there was an absolute decline of 
over 20%). Imports were of the order of 20% of G.D.P. in 1951, 37% in I960 
and 22% in 1962-63, but the import decline is exaggerated by the shift from 
"foreign ex post" Nigerian to domestic Camerounian sources in the final year.
With the exception of initial year imports and terminal year exports, West 
Camerounian foreign trade shares have been distinctly above East, a divergence 
which is even more marked in relation to commercialized G.D.P. .to which exports C
stood at over 55% and imports at over 60% in I960. V
The declining share of both imports and exports to G.D.P. - and **
especially to commercialized G.D.P. - taken in conjunction with the shift in
the structure of production and the rising levels of G.D.P. per capita for the 
East Cameroun confirms the development both of domestic production and of 
domestic markets at rates leading to a more "balanced" economic structure.*
The 1957-59 "exception" represents a shift in the export level tied to the 
Edea smelter. TW c ttlOr C.X p tr\ a. w m  — ey f<ar:\s rtuc
)wi Cv_ S % tv < -u Op E 0 P ^ rv J PC i r> £ j Jo 1 irs * P ( 3 I i p 0 S \ i i, I y 4P i) | /\i ~ T M ^  b <- 0 f c. tv r c j 11 v-d la D p. v ' •Ihe West Cameroun pattern is distinctly less satisfactory. Primary
export oriented growth to I960 generated distinctly less structural change than 
in the East, in fact the economy (albeit possibly not the commercialized sector) 
became less "balanced". While 1960-1962/63 appears to show a trend toward 
structural change and greater balance when trade shares alone are considered 
the absolute decline in exports and probably imports (even correcting for East 
Cameroun "imports")- in conjunction with the absolute fall in the secondary and 
relative falls in the secondary and tertiary sectors suggests regression not 
development, although income per capita appears to have risen slightly in real 
terms for the first time in the post-1951 period. r
Public recurrent expenditure - after its share 1951-57 rise - has 
continued to expand in relation to G.D.P. On balance general government has 
declined somewhat as a share of total recurrent expenditure and specified 
productive services risen.** In 1959 recurrent expenditure totalled 14.2% 
and in 1962-63 15.9% of G.D.P. while the share of commercialized G.D.P. was 
more stable, moving from 20.8% to 21.5%.
"Balanced" is here used in R. Nurkse's sense of relationship between "the 
domestic structure of production and of demand. Such balance exists by 
definition for self-use production so that "balance" in this sense needs
to be viewed in relation to the commercialized sector.> . .
The division cannot be estimated directly from the Compt'es Economigues 
because its "Administration" item represents governmejj* labour bill 
(i.e. government value added) not the coincidentally parallel Debt 
Service - Foreign Affairs - Security - Administration budget classifi­
cation sectors.    ,- rrr'T'D---------— --- —
J c T  v' gTTTiT/Tc tj G r o w  f kr'i’ U PA.'f/^ rrvi' ( y\J \
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Gross Domestic Supply s Sources and Uses
Analysis of 1962-63 domestic supply and its use shows the substantial 
complexity and diversity of production within the Cameroun economy. Similarly, 
the pattern of household consumption is a complex one diverging very signific­
antly from a "subsistence" pattern either in the self-production or the physical
necessity sense. , _ , . •. *]'»«.. ./ / 7  Zj f o o Y  • [ U X j l  O'*}
$
Total supply was'H^r^ million CFA (excluding margins, million
including^ of which 83% was domestic production and 17% imports^Domestic 
share exceeded 39% in all categories (albeit for heavy manufacturers only by 
a rather broad definition and inclusion of assembly and repair) - for non-food 
manufacturers and energy combined it was 43%.
Of total supply, including margins,.. 18% was exported leaving 186.6 OO 
million CFA for domestic use. Of this, million or 25% represented inter­
mediate itVO'jAS “ a measure of the increasing complexity of the economy in 
that it means approximately one third of all domestic consumption and invest­
ment passes through one or more processing or manufacturing stages between the 
initial producing and the final using unit.
Consumption accounted for 66% of domestic supply use (88% of final 
uses) when defined to include maintenance and replacement of non-commercial 
buildings and public works and 62% (83% of final uses) excluding them. At H, 
million CFA, household consumption took 55% of domestic supply and state 
at ]£,o m u  H im  ero ni>. j f • ) ' ‘ f ; % ,
9% (12% of final uses) was invested excluding all construction 
maintenance and repair, or 13% (17% of final uses) including it. These 
levels, while not high, are by no means exceptionally low even by technically 
advanced economy standards and give a rather different picture than the 
apparent 10% gross investment level a casual glance at the Comotes Economiques 
suggests.
Household consumption expenditure - excluding direct taxes and 
including total housing construction and maintenance as an alternative to 
rent - totals lO5.70Omillion CFA (/428 million) or 21,140 francs (/>86) per 
capita. Approximately two thirds represents commercial transactions which 
represent over half of all consumption except for unprocessed food (over half 
of total food consumption including processed food is commercialized), fuel 
(dominated by firewood) and construction (dominated by rural housing whose 
commercialized component is under-estimated). For non-food consumption, the 
commercialized share is almost three-quarters.
5 58% of total household consumption is food divided 35% basically
unprocessed and 23% processed. The second largest item is clothing (including 
textiles and footwear) at 11%. Other non-durable manufacturers stand at 8% 
as do consumer durables and housing taken together. Services (commercialized 
only) are 9% and fuel-light energy 5%.
The pattern clearly indicates the intermediate nature of the Cameroun 
economy and secondarily the leeway allowed by a tropical climate in regard to 
fuel and housing. Food does not totally dominate consumption - especially 
not commercialized consumption of which it is approximately half. Manufactured 
goods (excluding processed food) account for 22%' (30% of commercialized). Or , . 
However, the 3% consumer durables (outside the expatriate and Camerounian 
elite, largely bicycles and sewing machines) and 5% dwelling figure underline 
the low level of housing and hard goods available to 95-99% of the population.
The pattern can be seen to be relatively modern even more clearly if the 5.5 
million CFA public health and education expenditure are considered jointly 
with household consumption thereby raising services to approximately 14% and 
reducing food to 55% end'non commercialized *to little over 30%.
▼z
*1
The 22% expenditure on non-food manufacturers'underlined the sub­
stantial unbalance in the economy. Only 12^8j0million or 9% of domestic output 
of goods and services fall into these categories as opposed to 17.3 million 
or 58% of all imports.
G.D.P. Growth 1951-1965 Patterns and Forces
v a P  £  P P  ,
per-— v 1951-1965 saw a steady rise in real purchasing power GS
capitayin the Cameroun Republic as a whole, but not in the West Cameroun.
While the major dynamic force - at least until 1959 - was export expansion 
and investment directed to furthering exports, the short-term relationship 
is more complex, e.g. 1957-59, the most notable export boom in the East 
Cameroun was also IrfrcjLSub-period with static real G.D.p. purchasing power 
per capita. J,
1951's use as a base year is dictated by the absence of earlier
national accounts, not any particular economic logic - 1946-47 would be a
rather better benchmark for post-war economic change. In 1946 East Cameroun
real import capacity* stood at 135 on a 1930 base and per capita real import
capacity at 85, while by 1951 they had risen (about half by physical export 
expansion and half by commodity terms shifts) to 535 and 320. For the West 
1946 real import capacity probably stood at about 50 to a 1930 base and per
capita at 35, which by 1951 they had recovered to 120 and 70. (See Section
IV for a somewhat more detailed analysis of 1930-1951 trade volume, terms and 
import capacity changes). Per capita product in constant purchasing power 
terms probably stood at 160-170 (to a 1930 base) in the East and 90-95 in 
the West.**
From 1951 to 1957 the East, maintained a 6.8% rate of growth of
G.D.P. partly generated by a 4.8% export growth rate, but also by the rapid
increase in government consumption and private as well as government invest­
ment—both directed to re-establishing and broadening the export oriented mise 
en valeur strategy of the 1930's. Throughout the period a substantial but 
declining gap was maintained by budget subsidies and net private capital 
inflow (largely for Edea). Deflating for a 2% price and a 1.8% population 
increase rate yields a 3.1% growth of per capita G.D.P. purchasing power (in 
1959 prices).
1957-59 saw the fruition of the export investment with exports 
leaping over 30%, but with slackened investment and government expansion 
(private investment actually fell with Edea's completion) G.D.P. growth fell 
to 4% about equal to combined population and price increase rates.
From 1959 to 1962-63 government expenditure on recurrent account and 
both public and private investment resumed a more rapid tempo but one increas­
ingly directed (explicitly so from 1961) to national and regional (UDEAC) 
production and a 7.4% G.D.P. growth rate was attained. Exports were stagnant 
in import capacity terms, while imports rose at a 7.5% rate virtually elimin­
ating the 1959 trade surplus. Allowing for 2.5% price increase (partly related
*- Defined in terms of export purchasing power. 
The indices and weighting used are;
Non-Commercial Local Commercial Exoorts
East:- 100 160 320 Per capita 1951^ r ..
45 35 20 1 Weight 1951
West; 100 100 70 Per Capita 1951 
(1930 ■=■ 100)
50 25 25 Weight 1951
i &r 1 i
to sharp tax boosts to place the recurrent budget on a territorially balanced 
basis) and 2% population growth rates per capita G.D.P. purchasing power rose 
at a rate of 2.7%, Some slackening in growth occurred from 1962-63 to 1965 
but an overall rate of 6.4% and a constant per capita G.D.P. purchasing power 
one of 1.8% were maintained.
non-continuous data series make the computed magnitudes subject to wider
The West Cameroun growth was much less dynamic albeit weaker and partly
margins of error. From 1951 through 1957 at 4.8%^ growth rate of G.D.P. vna-e- -fuo L
pkct securer!, but more than matched by 4.1% price increase and 1.8% population 
growth rates leaving an annual decline of 1.5% in per capita G.D.P. pur­
chasing power in 1959 prices. 1957-59 apparently saw lower G.D.P. (2.8%) and 
price (2.0%) growth for a somewhat lower (l.0%) rate of fall of constant 
purchasing power G.D.P. per capita.
After 1959 - apparently based on increased government spending and 
possibly greater home market directed commercial production as the 7.4%. 
1951-57 and 9.4% 1957-59 export growth rates were reversed with a 6.1% 1959-63 
decline - G.D.P. growth rose to 5.5%. After allowing for 3% price increase 
(partly the result of reunion price shifts) and 2% population growth rates, 
a .4% increase in per capita constant purchasing power G.D.P. is suggested. 
1962-63 to 1965 was characterized by basically similar magnitudes.
I’)l per capita G.D.P. in constant purchasing power terms to a 1951 base 
was on the order of 140 in the Hast and 90 in the West. To a 1930 base, the 
values are on the order of 170-180 for the East and 80-85 for the West.*
Labour force data (see Section IA-M) suggest a'more rapid increase 
in wage and salary workers than of the population or the*labour force as a 
whole for the Cameroun as a whole and for the Eastern state but a fall in 
employed as a share of the labour force in the West over the period 1959- 
1962/63.  ^' If one lumps "modern commercialized" farmers - the larger Cameroun 
tree crop, cotton and tobacco growers fit this definition in that they market 
the bulk of their output, purchase most of their consumption needs, and employ 
at least some non-family labour paid at rates presumably related to its incre­
mental productivity - with wage and salary workers the "modern commercialized" 
segment of the labour force probably stands at 25-30%.of the total for the 
Federal Republic in 1962-63 vs. 22-28% in 1959 with the East 28-33% (26-31% 
1959) and the West 18-23% (19-24% 1959).
Such a pattern of modernization i$ labour force structure - both in 
employment and in modern commercial agriculture - is of critical significance 
in ensuring that development and higher levels of productivity become general­
ized rather than increasingly enclavized. A very small modern sector with 
rapidly rising productivity but directly involving a declining share of the 
labour force can certainly support short run economic growth but is unlikely
* In 1962-63 West G.D.P./capita was slightly under one half that of the
East. Apparently in 1930-G.D.P./capita was of the same order of magni­
tude in West as East - a result not inconsistent with the higher average 
level of development in the West Cameroun under German rule and the 
observed 1930-1951 and 1951-1962/63 trends.
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to provide - in itself. - an adequate base for cumulative development.*
Cameroun G.D.P. growth and maWeujp change suggest the varying impor­
tance of a series of external opportunities^stimuli}1' and of policy responses 
and initiatives over time. The sharp divergence of Hast and West results 
clearly underlines the limitations on the initial export market stimuli - at 
least in a small economy - in the absence of a strategy of generalizing from 
them into broader internal market production.
1951-1959 (in fact 1946-1959) was a "vent for surplus"**' export 
prospect and proceed supported (prospects resulted in external investment 
and budget support on the international level and construction - public 
service employment internally) period of fairly rapid growth. The economic 
structure changed toward commercialization and (slightly) toward greater 
relative direct dependence on foreign trade to provide markets and both con­
sumption and investment items. Somewhat atypically for such a period domestic 
market directed commercialized production grew^at^+he same order of magnitude 
as exports |Tt^ l eaiTT^Th^fre East, l ^
In the West - which had a rather lower rate of export expansion 
apparently because the plantation sector was either higher cost or less res­
ponsive to export market and prive incentives than the African farmers (whose 
share in Western exports grew rapidly) - tttPs primary export sustained growth 
became "fossilized".*** Development beyond the export sector did not take 
place and continued growth became totally dependent on a massive and growing 
budget subsidy for recurrent as well as capital expenditure.****
The East, however, partly implicitly and as a sum of individual 
decisions but since I960 increasingly explicitly and through policy tools, 
has followed a strategy of development generalization. The initial creation 
of linkages between an increasing share of the rural population and the export 
sector and the return flow involving the commercial-distribution and rural
Cf. J.C. Fei and G. Ranis, Development of the Labour Surplus Economy,
Yale Economic Growth Center Publications, Homewood, Illinois, 1964, and 
Ranis "Planning for Resources and Planning for Strategy Change", Weit- 
wirtshaftliches Archiv. Vol.95, 7^ 1 , 1965, for a fuller exposition of 
this criterion. While Ranis and Fei are basically concerned with land 
short economies the central importance of increasing the proportion of 
labour in sectors with payment related to incremental product and higher 
than average and growing productivity per man holds for labour and land 
surplus economies such as the Cameroun. However, a greater weight can 
be placed on rapid expansion of modern commercialized agriculture.
Gabon may exemplify the enclavized-declining share case in that while 
it has a higher present employed per cent, this is largely in construc­
tion of extractive sectors and may well decline with their entry into the 
operational phase unless expansion of its modern commercial agricultural 
sector (relatively much smaller than the Camerounian) receives priority 
' attention both to expand^directly dynamic involvement in the economy
and.to release labour for employment expansion.
** See H. Myint, "The ’Classical Theory1 of International Trade and the
Underdeveloped Countries", Economic Journal, June 1958.
*** Cf. H. Myint, "An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness", Oxford
Economic Papers, June 1954.
**** The subsidy by the mid-1960'.s represented a transfer of over 1% of East
Cameroun G.D.P. to the West where the gain represented nearly 5% of state 
G.D.P. The East Cameroun, in fact, meets the WQi-AD- goal for industrial 
economy aid transfers t r  E  C P )  i • /)
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sectors have given rise to more complex linkages. Agriculture has acquired 
increasing urban consumption and industrial cash markets. These have arisen 
not only from the commercial sector but from the growth in processing and man­
ufacturing divided been taking on additional productive stages in regard to 
exports (working forward from raw materials or, in the case of alumina, inter­
mediate good^ s) and consumption-construction goods (working backward from import 
distribution either through processing and assembly of semi-finished imports 
or difect use of ^ locally produced raw materials) c
* '■ ■ ■ # * . '  '*  / .  9  r
The result has been one of broadening involvement in the economy and 
^  continued development after a slackening of export growth. However, the 
process is still not fully autonomous both because of high export-import 
dependence foi%market base and foiy\specific goods and because investment 
(especially public investment) cannot be financed out of domestic savings 
(public or private) although a balance on recurrent expenditure has become 
attained within the growth process (and without noticeably checking it).
Capital Stock and Investment
\oojy
1962-63 Cameroun capital stock totalled 373\rfiillion CFA (/1,510 
million). The per capita capital stock was 74,600 CFA ($330^,^nd the domestic 
capital/output ratio 2.6. For the Eas^th*? figures were 31offfiTllion, 84,000 
per capita and 2.6, and for the West 58"ymillion, 46,400, and 3.0.
— ---C  C* P • T (P
These data clearly contradict any view of the Cameroun economy as
basically non-capital using. The ^ratio is within - although on the low end 
of - the "normal" range for industrialized economies. Capital stock per capita 
relatively much lower is 60% of that in Japan. If one takes the commercial­
ized sector and the assets attributable to it, they^ratio is 3.2, distinctly 
a normal result for a modern economy.  ^ x ; *
Rather more surprising - and contradictory to both accepted logic 
and experience in at least some other developing economies - the ^ratio
appears to have fallen from 1959-1962/63 - from 3.0 to 2.6 overall and from
3.9 to 3.2 for the commercial ^ ector. Although in part(this relates to the
sW/ (problem of valuation (the basist capital stock data are §./v 195^, there does 
appear to have been a genuine fall explicable in terms of the association of 
rapid increases in G,.D.P. and low incremental ^ratios and of changes in the 
composition of the capital stock - especially in the East - with the shares 
infrastructure and housing declining and those of plant and equipment rising.
Overall capital stock makeup includes 56$ construction (of which 
one sixth is "traditional" housing), 31% rural investment (three quarters 
tree crops), and 13% transport equipment and,machinery. 40% of all capital 
is of the direct labour investment or reproduction varieties not
involving substantial capital in its creation (three fifths of this
element is in tree crops).
The divergence between East and West Cameroun capital stocks is 
marked both on the per capita and the makeup levels. Construction is 57% 
in the East and 51% in the West because of the latter's much poorer infra­
structure-19 .4% vs. 27.7%-and lower share of modern buildings (housing - 
commercial - directly productive) of 15.5 vs. 18.4%. Transport equipment and 
machinery is 6.9% (3,200 CFA per capita) vs. 14.3% (12,000 CFA per capita.) 
Direct labour and/.reproduction investment is 37.6% in the East and 57.3% in 
the West (althougK absolutely and per capita the Eastern stock is much larger)
The relative paucity of capital in the West - and its structural 
makeup - go far to explaining not simply its lower per capita product but
c/‘
Cf. Ranis, "Planning ..... For Strategy Change", op cit. pp. 37 f.f, for 
a schematic presentation of such a strategy over a full ecohomic develop­
ment period from "subsistence" to "autonomous industrialized." c f
e s vcio-Peli + *
\ f\ j- I i ^  t » 1 f i * 4 S ♦  ^ a
also its higher ratio. Inadequate infrastructure hampers use of productive 
investment (including the direct labour category whi-eh requires access for 
its products to market as much as any other type of investment) reducing both 
its productivity and its rate of flow (and thus f
.Siouk)*
1959-1962/63 reductions in-thejfc-ratio (in the West these may almost 
totally reflect price changes but not in-the East) can be attributed in part 
to fuller utilization of infrastructure and modern construction (notably 
Edea dam) and to the increase in the share of transport equipment and 
machinery (from an eighth to a seventh in the East) which is itself an index 
of more intensive infrastructural .use.
j Unfortunatelys this particular shift and the low Eastern incremental
y&ratio - 2.0 after adjusting for price changes - cannot be expected to con­
tinue over the next decade. Indeed, the 1962/63-1965 lower growth rate with 
a higher ratio of investment to G.D.P. suggests the reversal has already begun 
Three factors are involvedt-
(a) Development requires territorial expansion of the area integrally 
linked to the present centres of dense economic activity neces­
sitating massive investment in infrastructure which initially will 
be under-utilized;
r t  rt
(b) The rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector will n»ees-»i-t-atc 
additional infrastructural investment (power, water, technical 
education, health, housing, urban facilities) which for technical 
reasons of unit size and gestation have relatively long payoff 
periods;
(c) Much of the new investment - including industrial plant - will 
require from 2.5 to 6 years from ground breaking to initial pro­
duction and another 1 to 2 years to attain full demanded capacity 
use.*
Admittedly there is the offsetting factor that the construction 
process itself generates additional incomes (and G.D.P.) immediately, but 
this poses problems until the real flow of consumer goods and services 
develops because the resultant demand either increases the increase in import 
requirements associated with investment to .8 or more** or leads to infla­
tionary pressures (or both).
This is not abnormal. Czech estimates for construction time range from 
2 years for typical light industry to over 6 for heavy industry and basic 
infrastructure.
** Direct import requirements are probably .6 for construction and .$ for 
equipment and machinery. If only domestic food among wage goods is in 
elastic supply - with additional transport facilities more marketed food 
at constant real prices will become available judging by the past decade1 
record - the import component of additional construction - investment 
wages and salaries could be up to The construction import component
can be reduced through early investment in materials production and fab­
rication notably cement, some wood products not now produced, and 
aluminium fabrication (fabricated aluminium is a significant import). 
Similarly early investment in mass consumer goods - notably clothing and 
footwear - will reduce the wages and salaries import component. Progress 
along both of these lines is, in fact, already under way on a signific­
ant scale.
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Doth gross and net investment totals are exceedingly hard to 
derive. Cpmptes Economigues figures exclude direct labour and.reproduction 
investment (except for rural housing which is lumped into household con­
sumption) and list a substantial share of public (and private productive 
building) replacement investment under consumption. Adjusting for this 
gives a gross investment, ratio of the order of 15% (excluding replacement 
direct labour investment) to 18% (including it) as opposed to the apparent 
10%.
 ^ Between 1959 and 1962/63 approximately 62% of an investment total 
of 66,%/ million CFA (/268 million) - excluding rural housing replacement of 
10-12 million - represented net additions to capital stock and 38% replace­
ment. 36.5% of total investment (25% of net additions and 60% of replace­
ment) was for equipment, 23.5% for modern buildings (24% of net additions 
24% of replacement), 24% for infrastructure (24% of net additions, 26% of 
replacement), and 15% (25% of net additions) direct labour investment. By 
economic sector the approximate breakdown of gross investment over the 1959- 
1962/63 period was 60% directly productive, 24% physical infrastructure and 
16% social infrastructure and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . % . i \ » i/ q v T f/*/
Adjusting for price changes, the net incremental ^ratio was 2.0 
over the period and the gross about 2.9, excluding, and 3.4, including 
replacement rural housing.
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Institutional Patterns in the Cameroun Economy
The working of an economy on the macro-level cannot be understood 
fully - at least from the policy or pedc^ogical viewpoints - without a picture 
of the pattern of institutions through which it operates. The functioning of 
these institutions not only determines the actual effects of exogenous and 
endogenous economic forces and the rate at which economic change takes place 
but alsoythrough its determination of resource control and income distribution} 
can act-:; as an independent determinant of the structures of production and 
demand. In no field is systematic description and analysis of the Cameroun 
economy (or other African economies) weaker and more fragmentary.*' Only 
monetary institutions have been treated with any completeness; quasi-public 
and autonomous state bodies have received fragmentary attention, as have large 
foreign corporate groups; small and medium concerns, whether expatriate or 
Camerounian, as well as the entire Camerounian agricultural - craft - small 
trade sectors, have had next to no economic research devoted to them. A body 
of generalizations exists but most are of the non-economic man, backbending 
labour supply curve, irrational conservatism variety which have regularly 
collapsed under analysis elsewhere in Africa and form both a misleading basis 
for analysis and a disfunctional guide to policy.**
The Cameroun-Equatorial African monetary system is best described as 
a franc exchange standard operating through a semi-flexible currency board 
type system backed by overdraft facilities with the French Treasury. The 
Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun, the I960 
successor to a series of currency emission institutes dating to 1940, is based 
on a Franco-African agreement governing external reserves (largely in the Bank - 
totally in francs), exchange control, credit creation, banking, the value of 
the CFA franc (alterable only by joint agreement of all six states). Separate 
national monetary committees (of which the Camerounian alone has a national 
majority membership) determine short term credit allocation and levels within 
a regional ceiling determined by the Board of the Banque which has (counting 
the Chairman) an overall French majority. De facto credit is limited to short 
term rediscounting of commercial paper as the Cameroun and Equatorial states 
handle short term borrowing through French Treasury advances not Treasury 
bills.***
The Banque held external reserves of about 16,000 million CFA and 
had made advances of 21,000 million CFA at the end of 1964, while its note 
issue stood at 25,500 million CFA at the end of 1964, 40% of the note issue 
and rather more of the advances being attributable to the Cameroun. The
* See H. Myint, "Economic Theory and The Underdeveloped Countries", Journal 
of Political Economy, October 1965, for more extended comments on this 
point and D. Seers "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary 
Producer in the Middle of the Twentieth Century" Economic Bulletin of 
Ghana, 1963 4; B. Van Arkadie "Mature of Structural Analysis of East
African Economies", East African Institute of Social Research Conference 
Papers 1965, and R.H. Green Stages in Economic Development : Changes in 
The Structure of Production., Demand and International Trade, Bank of the 
Sudan, 196tJ, for attempts to integrate institutional elements into struc­
tural macro-economic analysis.
** V. Thompson and R. Adloff (French West Africa, and The Emerging States of 
French Equatorial Africa, Stanford, 1959, 1961) present descriptions of 
large scale commercial sector and the African agricultural sector insti­
tutions for other Francophonic African states. J. Suret-Camale (Afrigue 
Noire : L’Ere Coloniale 1900-1945- Editions Sociales, 1963) offers an 
historical-analytical model of the operation of French public and private 
economic institutions in Africa especially during the "mise en valeur" 
period.TKt Forr^Cr 5uFFt-o ffurrr* **“•
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*** See P. Robson, "Economic Integration in Equatorial Africa" op cit and
"Monetary Systems and Integration : A Note" East African Economic Review, 
June' 1965; G. Le Due, op cit. and the Jeanneny R e p o r t ' T J J ' i h  
by .pcvclop---- InstituWiAkO for * more-
detailed description and evaluation.
combination of exchange control externally and identifiable state notes (in 
fact the Cameroun notes are now totally different albeit freely exchangeable 
at banks though not de facto in^circulation with Equatoriale notes) allows 
recording of interterritorial flows and attribution of effects on overseas 
Banque reserves (which are separated T  Of!.t f°r accounting
purposes but pooled for short run operating transactionsJ . International 
transactions are made through an operations account with the French Treasury 
which allows overdraft facilities automatically in the case of a Banque short 
term deficit.*
Looking beyond the formal statutes, the Banque represents both an 
embodiment of and a factor for maintaining .French monetary-financial control 
in the Cameroun and Equatorial Africa. The Jeanneny Report was quite frank 
in indicating that monetary tutelage and access to the French Treasury for 
short loans and the Caisse Centrale de Co-operation Economique for longer ones 
were the two sides of one coin. At least implicitly it also underlined the 
relationship between the monetary system - especially exchange and banking 
control - and maintenance of the French share in exports to, and commercial 
and banking operations in^Francophonic Africa. The system - which at the 
moment includes the taking of all substantive operating decisions in the Paris 
headquarters of the 3anque presumably in consultation with the Banque de France 
and French Treasury - is viable only so long as Cameroun economic strategy in 
regard to industrialization and regional economic orientation, diversification 
of trading partners, and Camerounianization of economic policy making in 
general is acceptable to France. \ r\ H i  'i' N
In 1962-63 Cameroun masse.monetaire (currency and bank deposits, the 
latter rather widely defined to include special government deposit accounts, 
commercial short-time accounts, and postal current accounts) averaged 19,515 
million CFA, 13.7% of'G.D.P. Of this, 52% (10,150 million odd) was currency 
and 48% (9,365 million odd) deposits. There is a very significant seasonal 
pattern with the peak in March (coffee and cocoa financing begins in the fourth 
quarter and is repaid in the second) and the trough in the late summer.
Cameroun money supply has grown more rapidly than G.D.P. - although 
in 1962-1964 this element is hard to separate from the introduction of the 
CFA currency (and deposit accounts) into the West Cameroun which (allowing for 
lower monetization) represented perhaps half of the 24% increase of 1962-63 
and for at least two-thirds of that year's 15% rise in currency. However,
1964's March peak again showed an increase of 23%, 32,858 million CFA vs 26,702 
in 1963 - at which point in the year the deposit component stood at 63% (58%
1963) as opposed to its average of about 50% of money supply.
Total credit outstanding at the end of February 1963 totalled 25,490 
million CFA (/ll6 million) vs 20,222 a year earlier. In November 1963 they 
stood at 18,331 million CFA (/74 million) vs 15,124 in 1962.
Short-term credit (February) was 19,835 million CFA (77%) of which 
44.5% was for general commerce, 33.3% to export produce (the source of most of 
the seasonal swing), 10.7% for industry including lumbering. Of this credit 
93.5% was in the East and 6.5% in the West Cameroun.
Medium term credit of 1,672 million and long term of 3,983 million
came largely from the Banque Camerounaise -de Developpement (2,520) and the 
(French) Caisse Centrale (2,908) although a somewhat higher proportion was 
distributed through commercial banks. November 1963 Banque Centrale redis­
counts by commercial banks stood at 9,187 million CFA or 70% of their total 
loans of about 13,000 million and at 85-90% of deposits somewhat exceeding 
10,000 million.
From the French point of view this provision avoids crisis sale of French 
s^curities^ In the medium run French control of-the Banque and its credit 
policy would act to restore "a credit balance to thb account.'
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The Banque Camerounaise de Developpement - successor to the 1949- 
1961 Credit du Cameroun - is a broadly based, rural sector emphasis directed 
(over 40%) development promotion body. Capital (1,000 million CFA as of June 
30th, 1963) is subscribed by the Cameroun Government, the Banque Centrale, the 
Caisse Centrale and the Bremer (Bremen) Landsbank. Borrowings and deposits 
totalled nearly 3,500 million CFA at June 30th, 1963, and about 6,000 million 
a year later.
Loans-advances-participations totalled 3,600 million CFA (/14.6 
million) in 1963 and 7,025 million (/26.4 million) in 1964, of which 226 million 
tr represented participations in equity with 224 million further commitments to 
these firms. By July 1964, nearly 40,000 credits had been granted, about 
three-quarters in agriculture (45% of the value with 29% to building loans,
10% each to commerce and artisanry-small industry, 3% for automobile purchase 
and 2% for light equipment). Loans were concentrated in the Douala,
Nkongsumba, Yaounde triangle, with nearly two-thirds of the value and over 
six-sevenths of the loans. The North received almost an eighth of the loans 
and almost a fifth of the value (over a third in agriculture) and West Cameroun 
(where activity began in 1963-64) a tenth of the value (a third of commerce and 
a half of vehicles) but less than a hundredth of all loans. An increase in 
industrial credit and participations by the 3.C.D. is seen as a part of 
Cameroun development strategy as is the intensive support to broadening 
commercial agriculture in the North and growing efforts to spur economic 
activity in the West.
Both West and Bast Cameroun possess stabilization funds (Marketing 
Board, Caisses de Stabilisation) for main export crops except bananas (coffee, 
cocoa, palm oil in the West, and coffee, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton in the East) 
and license exporters to deal in these crops at fixed buying prices and pay or 
receive a levy depending on the world market price.
In the East* groundnut and cotton stabilization was - until the early 
1960’s - greatly simplified by the French colonial preference system which both 
subsidized and stabilized export receipts. Cocoa - which had a tariff preference 
lout not a non-franc quota system parallel to that for oilseeds and cotton - was, 
moreover, sold as much to non-franc as franc markets. Coffee held an inter­
mediate position on both -counts. Oji sales to France there were a variety of 
"intervention prices" at which either automatic purchases (e.g. oilseeds) or 
loans to the Caisse (e.g. -coffee, cocoa) were provided. World price movements 
were also wider for' coffee and cocoa. Groundnut, cotton and - surprisingly - 
cocoa** producer prices were extremely stable. Coffee prices were, however, 
less stable albeit more so than export prices.***
The Western Board was a fairly standard British colonial marketing 
board but - partly because of its smaller size and partly because of the plan­
tation role in export production - was substantially less activeain economic 
policy implementation beyond short run stabilization.***f ^
fktQC I3K Kr'O
* For a more detailed study of Francophonic African stabilization see 
Commodity Stabilization Funds in the French Franc Area. FAO-UNO,
E/CN.13/51, Rome, 1962.
** Until 1960-61 Cameroun (East) producer cocoa prices were below the Cote 
d'Ivoire as well as Anglophonic Africa but for the next three seasons 
(and again with 1965 Nigeria-Ghana cbJts) they were comparable or higher.
*** Non-stabilization activities of industry promotion in production, quality, 
and market expansion have been distinctly secondary except for (apparently 
highly successful) cotton acreage incentive payments and technique 
improvement programmes. Quality differentials have been used to a limited 
extent with somewhat unclear results.
for more detailed analysis of the possible scope of Board operations cf. 
R.H. Green "Multi-Purpose Economic Institutions in Africa". qJournal of 
Modern African Studies. Vol. I, No. 2, 1963, and G.K. Helleiner, Economic 
Journal, September, 1964.
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The price falls of cocoa, oilseeds and coffee in the late 1950's and 
early 1960's sharply reduced Caisse reserves. In the West they were under 400 
million CFA (/l.6 million) at the end of 1962 and in the East 2,200 million 
(/8 .9 million).
In the past three years the impact of the E.E.C. substitution of 
(fairly limited) overall tariff protection for the French quota-tariff-subsidy 
system has combined with weakening world prices for coffee, cocoa and oilseeds 
to force producer price cuts to further deplete reserves.
The bulk of the crops have been, and are, handled by French (and 
secondarily UAC-Unilever) firms. Co-operatives and African firms do hold a 
growing number of licenses but their share in turnover is still relatively 
low. Both the financial requirements of large short- to medium-term credit 
to finance the producer advance-purchase-export and shipment-receipt period 
(3 to 8 months) and the value of established contacts with major buyers 
combined with knowledge of the market severely hamper small, new, and 
Cameroun based firms.
F'ara-statal and quasi-public corporations have in the past been 
basically in railroads and harbours and electricity and communications in the 
East, plus the Cameroun Development Corporation (plantation agriculture) and 
hotels in the West. All have been run on basically commercial lines by 
dominantly expatriate managers and - with the exception of C.D.C. which has 
an extremely erratic and overall unsatisfactory record especially in regard 
to sluggish growth and delayed shifting out of bananas - reasonably satisfac­
tory financial and service provision results. Htfv/u } k  Zf j[“~
The role of para-statal bodies has increased to some extent in the 
areas of airlines, hotels and construction and may include a limited number of 
industrial ventures (e.g. cement) although these - like ENELCAM (electricity) - 
will probably be normal corporations with state board members and shareholdings 
rather than specially constituted autonomous public bodies. The most important 
of the new corporations is the Transcam which is joint Cameroun-T^hadian-French 
with effective French executive and directoral control.
%
The largely closed circuit institutional pattern of the franc zone 
with its "balancing" transfers of high priced manufactured goods and personnel 0* 4^ 0 r'<- 
£ - ' artificial commodity prices and budget subsidiesfHas undergone-
limited changes, all designed primarily to reduce the cost of the African franc r 
zone to the French Treasury. The ending of recurrent budget subsidies (see 
Section VII), the phasing out of most primary product price support, and the 
initiation of F.E.D. through which ex-colonial development costs are partially 
transferred to France's E.E.C. partners all fit into this pattern which is most 
fully formulated in the Jeanneny Report.
However, these changes - despite their short run costs and dislocative 
effects -are also, in the long run interest of the Cameroun. In conjunction with 
the revised E.E.C. Associate status provided in the Yaounde Convention, they do 
increase Cameroun fiscal autonomy, focus attention on efficiency of the export 
sector, reduce the degree of dependence on France, and open a broader array of 
import sources, foreign firms, and public resource transfer sources to the 
Cameroun.
The short-run impact of F.E.D., and of equal access for E.E.C. "Five" 
and French goods, commercial houses, and investors to the .Cameroun has been 
limited. The highly concentrated and basically French commercial community 
has not shifted sources of supply nor has the Camerounian government - para 
statal sector altered its "buy French" tradition except for loans from the 
U.S.A. and - partially - West Germany. C X  fCuWp 11. <'V
F.E.D., until 1964, received project proposals from Metropolitan 
governments not overseas territories. At least for ex-A.E.F-., Cameroun, Togo, 
ex-A.O.F., it operated as a finance house for metropolitan decisions taken in a 
still French centered context. Since the Yaounde Convention came into operation
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Associates approach F.E.D. directly. The Commission - and to some extent 
the "Five" - are more disposed to support structural change, at least poten­
tially including industry, than was France and. in any event, F.E.D. decisions 
are now independent of F.A.C. and Caisse Centrale approval on a project by 
project basis. Nonetheless, F.E.D. grant policy is still based on a cautious 
development strategy and - perforce - is linked with that of France both as 
the largest contributor to F.A.C. and the other major source of Cameroun 
i development funds (see Section IV).*, .**•»-«
I f") M'S'j ft lr Sm " T J m  „ — -
Private economic institutions fall into four classes; large expat­
riate, medium and small expatriate, urban Cameroun, and rural Camerounian.
The first . . non-agricultural, .enterprise except retail and domestic
produce wholesale and transpdrT^whicK fall into theJthird^ the fourth
dominates primary sector production. The second is partially dependent on the 
resident expatriate and urban African service and processed foodstuffs market 
and partly on its role as an intermediary between the larger expatriate enter­
prises and small African producing or trading units. Direct competition is 
greatest between the second and third sectors and is almost certain to inten­
sify, although both state intervention on behalf of Camerounian businessmen 
and public reaction against European-Mediterranean small and medium proprietors 
are relatively mild compared to Anglophonic West, or a fortiari East, Africa.
The large scale foreign sector is highly concentrated, partly as a 
result of the small size of the Cameroun economy and the relatively high capital 
and overhead requirements on long distance trade and partly as a reflection of 
cartelization in France. Three groups CrAG - SCOA - and (distinctly smaller) 
UAC/Unilever dominate import-export trade, departmental stores and whole­
saling of import-export goods, and shipping.
Forestry and industry are somewhat more diversified in ownership 
(albeit the Big Three are involved) so far as the Cameroun is concerned, but 
again the key firms are subsidiaries of major French oligopoly groups.
ALUCAM, for example, is a fully controlled member of the Pechiney-Ugine group. 
Air Liquide is one of the African subsidiaries of the European group, La 
Maison du Cycle is closely tied to (though not owned by) Peugeot, Bata Cameroun 
is a member of the global group (in this case not a dominantly franc zone one).
This cartelized, French centered institutional pattern has several 
effects. Purchases and sales within groups are usually preferred to outside 
transactions so long as the group benefits whether this is in the interests of 
the Cameroun unit or not. Intra-group prices are potentially artificial and
> v maY- 
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ay be used to channel profits to any selected unit either Arr-’
group investment policies.** Competition among the handful of 
oligopalists is less likely than a live and let live accommodation, especially 
as regards prices. The small, geographically and socially compact nature of the 
managerial community further reinforces tendencies to avoid both competition and 
j arduous attempts to raise efficiency and lower costs. The "equilibrium" -
except in the case of depression\pressures - is likely to be one of high costs, 
use of traditional sources and meYhods, low competition, and absence of intense
concern with efficiency. % ^ ^  \
j
See E.E.C., European Economic Community Bulletin. Brussels; JeartneTy'
Report (English Summary-by Ove-r-eeao Development Inoti-tu L i T c t o 'rn; T9£kT;) 
Yaounde Convention ( FmfK-*K T-y*n^LajH nn by Chatham, Houae -^-fccrnc!bh J TQ&.TI 
for fuller details on the institutional and legal patterns of Associate 
status.
** In principle both intra-group transaction preference and artificial prices
could benefit the Cameroun units. On balance this seems unlikely, there
is more room for selling high-cost manufactures in the Cameroun than 
primary products in France and a parallel bias toward preferring to take 
/ ^  profits in the accounts of the home company. Cf. Section IV on ALUCAM's
apparent capture of profits from FRIA and transfer of (rather larger)
7 profits t£ Ugine-Pechiney by "non-free market" pricing.
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The medium and small sized expatriate firms are largely Mediterranean 
with substantial Greek, Cypriot, Italian and Levantine participation. They 
range from rather substantial establishments - e.g. in oil-crushing, soap 
manufacture, sawmilling and baking - moving into the large scale group to 
small boutiques and service establishments catering to the expatriate and 
high income African elite.* Between are a number of larger service, e.g. 
garages, and smaller manufacturing, e.g. furniture establishments and a number 
of wholesalers and wholesale-retail establishments serving largely as inter­
mediaries between the major import-export houses and the African consumers- 
small traders-producers.
B By and large this sector appears to be a high cost one, partly
because of scale and partly because of credit risks. It does not appear to 
be highly price competitive and,with the limitations independence has put on 
new entrants from the Mediterranean,may become less so. ff>< ’ Vl
^  f  r H ' I ' W - i i t ,  r   ^ i  \4*“ * *
Urban African enterprise is relatively small, both i'n size of most 
units and in overall sectoral scope. Some service, boutique, and intermediate 
trading units are in direct competition with the small scale expatriate units. 
Governmental financial and regulation policy support and large expatriate firm 
public relations interests tend to favour them while lack of experience, own 
capital, and technical expertise (e.g. re garages, hotels) hamper their advance.
State-political involvement is probably highly pervasive, not simply 
through B.C.D. loans but even more because higher civil servants and politicians 
are prominent among the business community both as operating owners and 
"influential" partners. Given their higher than average educational levels, 
private resources, and access both to the state and to large expatriate 
concerns, this trend is not surprising. It does, however, raise conflict of 
interest (and at the extreme corruption) issues and ties economic opportunity 
into the political structure in a way likely to increase social tensions.
op f orf v ✓v/fy For3
Small tonmedium scale commerce - urban and rural markets, lorry 
transport of domestic produce and passengers, initial collection and bulking 
of export produce, collection and transfer of food and charcoal to urban 
markets - is a major source of employment. The market segment i-s- probei»I-y >
the dominant non-agricultural employment &  women. However, this sub-sector 
is not highly specialized as a majority of market traders, collectors, and 
even transport owners are also farmers or lower civil servants. '
Farming is, both in numbers employed and in earnings, the leading 
African sector. The dynamic sub-sector includes the tree crop growers (cocoa, 
coffee, planted oil palms) of the forest belt and the larger cotton, tobacco, 
groundbut producers of the savannah. While most livestock raising (and
/ -|V\iw It*- LaW*.-,*;, 
or Si err*.
* The petit blanc element is less pervasive than in Senegal or the Ivory 
Coast but far more pronounced than in Anglophonic West Africa. The 
Levantine element is, however, much smaller^ apparently being less able 
to compete with the small French, other European Mediterranean entre­
preneurs than with the larger British firms.. - v>-V
V ** See P.J. Bohannen (Editor), Markets In Africa. Northwestern University,
1962, for accounts of West and Equatorial African (not specifically 
Camerounian) markets.
certainly the related long distance internal trade in cattle)*', coastal and 
lacustrine market fishing, and some of the larger domestic foodstuff farmers 
are also dominantly market oriented, the majority of food producers are unable 
to concentrate on marketable surplus generation partly because food farming 
techniques do not yield large surpluses above family needs and partly because 
neither domestic cash markets nor access to them are adequate. } 
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The standard view of the African cattle owner as non-economically 
motivated has never fully and rarely even largely stood up to intensive 
examination. Source of food, "natural" interest yielding investment, and 
purchasing power reserve (including but not simply famine and reverse 
dowery needs) have been dominant while urban market supply orientation 
grows very rapidly as soon as sizeable markets and even minimally adequate 
transportation routes to them become known. Cf. S;. Amin, Trois Experiences 
Africaines du Developpement« op cit, on the growth of the market directed 
livestock sector in Mali. Polly Hill has made similar findings in regard 
to both Northern and Southern Ghanaian cattle growers— v < r ■ —
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IV. Cameroun International Economic relations:
A - \ The Structures of Trade. Resource Transfers
and Economic Dependence
The Cameroun economy has been - and to a lesser but still dominant 
degree remains - externally dependent not simply for markets and manufactured 
products but even more for the financing of domestic investment and the meeting 
of domestic high level manpower requirements. Substantial growth has been 
attained within the externally dependent structure and,with it,increased oppor­
tunities- for development reducing the degree of dependence. This strategy is 
all the more urgent in that the growth prospects for Camerounian exports (even 
including additional processing) are decidedly poor and maintenance of a high 
growth rate is not compatible with present import content of consumption and 
investment barring^quite implausible capital transfers. Cameroun external 
dependence is extremely concentrated on a handful of states, a pattern which 
has shifted only marginally (except perhaps on the resource transfer side)
despite the creation of E.E.C. and the YaoundefDAssociate Convention and the
attempts of the Cameroun to improve its bargaining position through diversi­
fication of economic partners since independence
Long Rury Trade Growth
e g
From 1930 through QX 1963 East Cameroun real export volume (100 to 
875), income terms of trade or domestic import capacity (100 to 1,100) and 
domestic import capacity per capita (100 to 565) have grown steadily with the 
exception of a wartime hiatus. However, 1959-1963 shows a significant decline 
in growth (real domestic import capacity Der capita if anything fell slightly).
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Commodity terms of trade have behaved erratically, falling to 65 in- 
1946 but recovering to 150 in the 1950's before falling to 125 in 1963 (base 
1930). Actual per capita imports have also behaved less regularly, falling
to 70 in 1946, exploding to 380 in 1951, declining tg=^ 34€> (after peaking at
about 400 in 1958) Kin 1959, and recovering to 390 in 1963. , k  si \ w
“ •4C"v7r p ■ b >
In the short run, the association between import levels and growth
rates and G.D.P. growth appears closer than that with exports. Investment in
advance of export increases (or since 1959 inpdomestic market oriented pro­
duction) has given rise to high and rising imports as well as rapid G.D.P. 
growth, while the 1957-59 export boom resulting in much higher remittances 
(both household and corporate) and net private capital outflow was accompanied 
by a slackening in growth rate. The 1959-1963 pick-up in investment and 
resource inflows led to rapid growth of G.D.P. and of imports* even though 
exports actually remained below 1959 value until 1963. ^
West Cameroun performance, especially by contrast, is dismal.
1963 export volume stood at 135 (base 1930) down from 155 in 1959 which culmi­
nated a rise from 85 in 1946. Income terms stood at 170 down from 230 in 1959 
(a recovery and growth from 55 in 1946) but real domestic import capacity per 
capita was only 80 vs. 120 in 1959 and 90 in 1951 (but 35 in 1946). Real per 
capita imports, however, stood at 135-160 - depending on treatment of East 
Cameroun substitutes for Nigerian goods - only marginally down on 1959's 170 
and well above 1951's 90, let alone 1946's 35. The import boom came later 
because it was supported by present and past exports and not advanced by pre­
export investment as in the East. The 1959-63 figures cast some doubt on the 
apparently satisfactory (see Section III) rate of growth for those years.**
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* 3ut cf. Tables IV-C-1 and IV-D-1'^'’However, the 6,000 million CFA un­
recorded import figure for 1959 is distinctly implausible, especially 
compared to 1,000 in 19,57 and 400 in 1962/63. %
> cck 11 y J  ■ * — ■ ■ --nV
** The problem is^with the real growth figures and may mean that
available price data understate the rate of price increases.
Cameroun exports are exceedingly concentrated with cocoa and prod­
ucts (31%) 5 coffee (23%), alvw.lniur. (16%) ccounting for two-thirds, and 
cotton (6%), bananas (6%), logs and timber (6%), rubber (4%) and oilseeds 
(4%) about 80% of the remainder for a total of 93% in 1963.
0 '1 *) T "i . ' •/ \ev/
The state patterns are somewhat divergent, but a^ rfreaot 00 concen­
trated. In the East cocoa-coffee~alumlniurn total 70%, and cotton-logs and 
timber-oilseeds-bananas-rubber 23%, Bananas (24% - down from 1960-62 levels 
in the 30-35% range with the loss of U.K. preferential market entry), cocoa 
(23%), rubber (20%) arid coffee (16%) accounted for 83% of West Cameroun 
exports in 1963^a®d'Timber (6%), palm oil (7%) and palm kernels (3%) 80% of 
the balance for a total of 96%. * ■ ’
r There have been significant changes in specific commodity contri­
butions over the period 1951-1963. Banana proceeds have declined absolutely 
for both regions - a disastrous development for the West. Cocoa earnings 
overall - especially in the East - have grown much less rapidly than those 
from coffee. Rubber earnings have been distinctly erratic - linked to both 
price and output swings. Log and timber earnings have grown steadily as a 
share of Eastern exports, but in the West exploded upward in the mid and late 
1950's to fall by nearly 75% between I960 and 1963.
Two significant and one potentially significant new exports have 
appeared. - all in the East.* Cotton has moved from insignificance to 7% of 
total exports (East) while plyv^ood and veneer has (beginning in 1961) come to 
somewhat under 1%. The addition, however, is aluminium based on
imported bauxite which accounted for 18% of 1963 e x p o r t s 0 v e r  40% of 
this represented current import content which is .negligible in other exports)^
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a '  ^  ^ /O— 1» Except for aluminium and cocoa - about 10-12% of which is converted
to cocoa butter and powder - oroeessing has either not extended past the
stages necessary for export, e.g. latox curing, cotton ginning,, coffee curing,
cocoa fermenting - or has actually declined in its share of exports handled
as with lumber and rough forms (even plus plywood and veneer) vis-a-vis. raw
logs . 5 V fWd, I* . I rmr«. S rw\ V} d ♦ V K ttfu
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Useable import composition data are available only for the East •
Cameroun prior to 1962-63 because West Cameroun import data did not record 
either Nigerian imports or foreign goods imported via Nigeria. The 1962-63 
pattern underlines the less developed, less internal market oriented, and 
less buoyant nature of the Western state economy with food and alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco higher and all other categories - except fuel and 
vehicles - lower as a share of total imports.
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Hxport-Import Patterns b y ■Commodity
* From a purely Western point of view, tea may be a potentially signifi-' \J .SC f w! 
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** The aluminium export price (£150 pep ton) and the alumina import price 
(£18 per ton) appear to represent artificial inter-company transactions 
to shift profits away from Guinea^andr-to a lasser degree-., Cameroun ; ■ 
operations and to other (presumably French) corporate units. The "world 
market" (also rather artificial) prices in 1963 were around £25 and £170 
respectively - a shift of £14 to Cameroun, on, 2 tons of alumina \j; •’
O n t of aluminium, and of £20 from the 'Cameroun per’ ton of aluminium. (For 
detailed price and cost data cf» H, Bachman, Aluminium as an Export 
Industry, UNCTAD, Geneva., 1964, cit^dfByT. Killick in Birmingham,
Neustadt, Cmaboe (Editors).,* The Economy of Ghana, Allen and Unwin, 1966, 
pp. 399 ff.) ? alvwin:. impels at nearly 150,000 tons represent 
30-35% stockpiling and: cahnot be compared directly with 1963 aluminium 
exports of 52,000 odd which consumed only' TOO-105,000 tons.*
In 1963, 49/k of East Cameroun imports were consumer goods, 22% inter­
mediate current imports (including fuel) and 29% machinery, transport equipment 
and construction imports.* The 1948 shares were 63-13-24, the 1951 55-16-29, 
the 1957 53-18-29 and the 1959 56-22-22. The changes in import makeup portray 
the impact'of Alumina (intermediate) imports from 1959, the growth of domestic 
manufacturing especially after 1959, and the 1948-51 upward shift and 1957-59 
slump in investment /G.D.P. ratios. The low growth in fuel imports presumably 
reflects the substitution (relative share) of hydro-electric power.
Textiles-clothing-footwear form the largest single commodity group 
at 16%, a result predictable from consumption analysis. Alumina stands at 9%. 
Major construction material imports include cement (1.5%), iron and steel (4%) 
and - surprisingly - aluminium bars, rods, tubes and forms (1%). The machinery 
and transport equipment category breaks down 11% transport equipment, 4% 
electrical machinery and 7% other machinery, with a 6% fuel category required 
for its operation. 1 L-'"' s * •
The pattern is - again - by no means that normally associated with 
a "backward” economy. Both the capital and the current intermediate goods 
shares are relatively high and rising. While textiles are a very substantial 
component, they do not dominate consumer goods imports which reflect the 
moderately diversified consumption pattern outlined above (Section III). On 
the other hand, a 49% final consumer goods import share (especially with one 
third of it representing textiles-clothing-footwear in a cotton, leather, 
rubber producing country) suggests only limited import substitution to date 
and an absence of effective protection.
Trade, Production, Use Patterns
Examination of import patterns against domestic production reveals 
substantial overlap in food, tobacco and beer plus aluminium household ware 
and significant overlaps in health-sanitation goods (actually soap) and 
clothing-footwear but very little in other consumer goods, construction 
materials, fuel or machinery and equipment. Cn the export side only timber 
products among the major exports have a significant Cameroun market if one 
separates export and local consumption,/bananas. Ironically, nearly half of 
cotton export volume is imported in the form of textiles and clothing and both 
ruber and (basic form) aluminium imports are significant.
On the one hand, this division between imported and domestic produc­
tion for local use and between local demand and export production lowers the 
flexibility of the economy. It is not feasible - given present plant and agri­
cultural investment - to shift exports to meet local demand or to substitute 
marginally between domestic production and most key imports. However, the 
nature of imports taken jointly with the raw material base (cotton,' tobacco, 
rubber, vegetable oils, meat and fish, potable alcohol, sugar, rice, timber 
limestone, potentially bauxite and alumina, hydro-electric power) and the 
existing market size affords opportunities for fairly extensive import substi­
tution based commercial agricultural and industrial expansion. Mass market 
consumer soft goods, furniture and furnishings, construction materials, and 
assembly of machinery and transport equipment, plus limited component manuf­
acture offer substantial possibilities for industrial value added creation and, 
in most cases, for domestic import production leading to low recurrent import 
content and a high domestic multiplier.**
Textiles are treated 75% as a final consumer good and 25% as a current 
import into industrial and craft clothing production.
The objections raised to import substitution based industrialization on 
the grounds that it ignores projected demand growth or concentrates on 
meeting "elite” not mass consumption or investment needs (cf. e.g. J. La 
Croix "Principes Pour Une Strategie du Developpement IndustrieU*" in 
Problemes Socio-Economigues Actuels du Congo. Institut de Recherches 
Economiques et Sociales, Louanium University) are not directly relevant 
given the actual makeup of prospective import substitute production and 
its relevance to demand patterns under conditions of rapid development.
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A short list o,f import substitution based development apparently 
practicable over the next' decade (see Table IV-C+8) totals 10,075 million CFA 
($41 million) domestic product, of which 6,165 million CFA ($25 million) would 
be industrial value added ■a£t 1963 import levels. Assuming a 6-1.5% G.D.P. 
growth rate, this group of products should have a rate of domestic demand 
growth of perhaps 5-6%. The initial industrial base is 32% of 1963 imports,
62% of 1962-63 industrial value added (51% of 1965) and 150% of 1962-63 domes­
tic market directed industrial value added%(ac4««^T^'the--4omestic-ma-*4^et 
directed share would be 120% as 18% of the 6,165 is in alumina processing).
Assuming early scheduling of the construction outputs, the import 
component should run to 8-9,000 million CFA (/32.5-36.5 million) of a total 
of about 15,000 million CFA ($61 million) industrial and perhaps 209**00(3 
million CFA (fij 1 million) total investment. Given the recurrent import saving 
involved, the import intensity of this programme would appear low enough to 
cause net improvements in the balance of trade to appear once 40-50% of the 
units are in full production.*
Export processing possibilities, while less extensive, are also 
significant. A parallel ten year short list (Table IV-C-9) suggests a total 
processing value added of 3,250 million to 5,000 million CFA - 10-15% of 1963 
exports and 33-51% of 1962-63 industrial value added (27-42% of 1965). The 
probable investment cost would be on the order of 7,500-12,500 million, with 
a direct import content (assuming early expansion of construction materials 
production) of 4,500-7,500. The success of this method of increasing exports 
is heavily dependent both on securing African markets (particularly for tex­
tiles, tyres and aluminium basic forms) and on results of UMTAD efforts to 
secure less discriminatory tariffs on processed as opposed to raw materials, 
particularly in E.E.C.** J ‘
Substantial achievement of these possibilities would not only free 
14-16,000. million CFA (44-51% of 1963 imports)'^ , for more complex consumer, 
intermediate $nd capital imports. Equally important, it would lead to a 
doubling of the 1965 oj^dustria1 value added base, quite apart from parallel 
G.D.P. growth supported exp'Sneiao,.and support,a majdr construction and invest­
ment spur to G.D.P;. growth and the fulFex utilization of projected physical 
and social overhead investment. However, beyoTltt^Q^^^and for some industries 
well before - further expansion will come to depend heavily" on markets broader 
than- those of the Cameroun Republic and - for machinery and equipment - 
probably broader than those afforded by UDEAC.
Balance of Payments
Camerounian balance of payments statistics run from extremely weak 
to quite non-reconstructabie. In the East, major problems include lumping of 
invisible imports in the c.i.f. import price (or apparently in some cases 
their non-appearance in the accounts), exclusion of reinvested foreign owned 
profits (up to 80% of total private investment in some years) rather than 
their double entry as factor payments and capital receipts, and general over- 
aggregation of estimates.***
* cf. C. Diaz-Alejandro, "On the Import.Intensity of Import Substitution", 
Kyklos. /3, 1965.
** cf. Towards a New Trade Policy for Development ("The Prebisch Report"), 
UNCIAD, UNE/Conf.46/3, New York, 1964, and World Economic Survey 1963 
(Part I, Chapters 5,7), United Nations, New York, 1964.
*** All Comptes Economiques balance of payments presentations are partly 
estimates, although total public and partial private transfer data do 
provide a hard core of statistical evidence. Banque Centrale data cover 
net transfers but do not provide adequate information on types of flow 
or gross levels in sectors with both in and out movements.
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Several facts do stand out clearly. The first is a massive and 
continued public transfer inflow for general recurrent expenses (to I960), 
public (including autonomous corporation) investment, and payment of technical 
assistance and service (especially education and health) personnel running 
over a quarter of export receipts. The second is a somewhat larger outflow 
of personal remittances (over 10% of imports) and profit flows (over 20% of 
exports) running in recent years at 6-7% of East G.D.P. Net inflows of new £ 
as opposed to reinvested profit j) private capital were massive in 1951 (over 
75% of exports and over half of imports), but much lower in 1957 and 1962-63 
(11% and 6-7% of exports respectively) and negative (-7% of exports) in 1959. 
Only in 1951 did they exceed profit remittances. Finally,since 1957,the 
Cameroun has in most years reduced its foreign debt (although this trend has 
now been reversed with new long term loans, especially for the Transcam) 
and/or increased its overseas (franc) reserves.
&6-4v*n West Cameroun balance of payments statistics are not reconstructable I 
^because of the extreme approximation required to secure import estimates.
Over the period 1951-1961, there appears to have been a substantial deficit 
on goods and services account, plus a significant flow of remittances from 
Nigerian workers and small businessmen (ppw drastically cut) balanced by 
public recurrent and capital subsidies^ depletion (especially after 1955) of 
marketing board^ and in some years of Cameroun Development Corporation^) net 
foreign assets.
Trade-Aid-Personnel ; Patterns of Concentration
...... Cameroun trade is highly concentrated - 50% of both imports and.
exports are carried on with France and 80% of imports and 83% of exports with 
five countries (not identical for exports U.K.-U.S.A.-Netherlands-West 
Germany, and for imports where Japan replaces the Netherlands). Only in the 
West Cameroun - with the end of British preference - has there been any massive 
shift since 1951 and,vis-a-vis.,1938 the East Cameroun import pattern is dis­
tinctly more concentrated* and the export one only marginally less so.
East Cameroun trade patterns have been remarkably constant since 
1957. The increase of imports from African states from 7 to 13% stems directly 
from alumina imports from Guinea - the other major African imports (dating to 
1951) are wine, sugar and fish from the Mahgreb. France accounts (1963) for 
57% of imports, other franc zone for 15%, other E.E.C. for 13%. 57% of exports
go to France, 4% to other franc zone (Mahgreb coffee-cocoa exports usually 
approximately equal imports; 1963 was an exceptionally low export year), 27% 
to other E.E.C. (16% Netherlands). Total Afri can exports have - since I960 - 
run 6-8%, 2-4% to the Mahgreb, 2% to U.D.E., 1% to Nigeria.' '
While the "E.E.C. Five" share in exports rose from 23% in 1951 to 
27% in 1963 and in imports from 6% to 13%, most of the increase came prior to 
1957 and the Treaty of Rome's equal access provisions seem to have been 
relatively ineffective. The probably reason lies in the French (more partic­
ularly^ CFAO and SODA groups) dominance of trade and the ties of the French 
commercial houses with suppliers and purchasers. j,
West Cameroun trade patterns have "shifted steadily since 1951 with 
the U.K. share in exports falling from 99^51% and that of E.E.C. rising from 
nil to 36 (18% Italy - largely bananas, 14% Netherlands). Exports to France 
remained negligible in 1962-63. On the import side, 1962-63 still showed _43% 
U.K. and 49% E.F.T.A. vs 7% France and 16% E.E.C. j£$jmp&asks with the U.S.A.’ 
equal to and Japan higher”than France as import suppliers. The pattern, 
however, remains in flux, both with continued tariff-fiscal unification and 
the supplanting of Nigerian and British by Camerounian (often East Camerounian) 
and French commercial concerns. . ±\
As noted earlier, this is the result of deliberate French policy aimed at 
foreign exchange husbanding in the early post-war period and captive 
market creation throughout, which was freed after 1945 from earlier League 
of Nations restraints.
% Q
In the case of aid, E.E.C. associate status provisions - especially 
the Fonds Europeen de Developpernent (F.E.D.) - have resulted in a substantial, 
if slightly equivoc:!, chift ir. sources*. Prior to 1958 virtually 100% of 
Cameroun capital and personnel aid receipts were from France. In 1960-64, 
however, F.E.D. capital aid commitments (13,500 million CFA - /45 million) 
were 45% of the 30,000 million CFA ($121 million) total, French 33% and West 
German 3% (a per cent which has since risen significantly). U.S.A. commit­
ments were 13%, representing a success of Cameroun efforts to broaden aid 
sources, but British capital aid commitments were only 1,100 million CFA (4%) 
virtually all prior to reunification as opposed to hopes for a continued 
annual flow of perhaps 500 million a year.
Of total capital aid commitments, 32% (32% of E.E.C., 29% of French, 
61% of U.S.A.) were for the Transcam, about half in loan and half in grant 
commitments. The bulk of the other aid - including all of F.E.D’s - has been 
on a grant basis for infrastructure and agricultural diversification (F.E.D. 
grants to offset loss of French market subsidies and other primary export 
price declines). The reason that F.E.D. aid is a somewhat doubtful "alter­
native" to French is that F.E.D, represents a deliberate French policy of 
shifting some of associate development cost on the Five, combined with French 
dominance (as the largest contributor) over its allocation. In the First 
Fund (1958-62) F.E.D. was a basic physical and social overhead investment 
support source closely linked to French public and private directly productive 
investment programmes. Although the Second Fund (1963-68) reflects both 
European Commission and "Five" (especially Netherlands and W. German) belief: 
that F.E.D. should be both more independent and more daring in its development 
strategy (e.g. including support for mixed and possibly public industry), the 
real impact of these principles is not yet clear.
[S t( ^  t\*vy F* \/Ov'fi k a r i i r a ; J to*-, s,
France remains the dominant supplier of aid personnel with about 
1,000 or 77% of a total of approximately 1,300. The United States is second
with 150 (12%), dominantly West Cameroun Peace Corps teachers. United Nations
agencies and 7 Wy organizations with 50 (4%) are third in personnel aid and 
sixth in capital' aid commitments with 2%. v 
— - r i T tofcl./’
The Structure of External Dependence
Cameroun external economic dependence is not satisfactorily seen or 
discussed solely in export and import to G.D.P. ratios. At slightly under 
fifty per cent in relation to total G.D.P. and about sixty per cent to Commer­
cialized G.D.P. the combined trade total is high but not of an order of
magnitude,above that of several of the smaller industrial economies or of the 
United Kingdom. A number of additional indicators are needed to illuminate the 
full extent of dependence.
One group presents the concentration of trade, capital, transfer and 
personnel supply with a limited number of economically much larger states.** 
Another shows the share of capital and high level manpower which must be secured 
from abroad and a third the degree of flexibility or inflexibility in domestic 
resources.***
cf. Convention of Association and Annexed Documents ("Yaounde Convention") 
OCAM, Yaounde, 1963, and J.J. van der Lee "Association Relations Between 
the European Economic Community and African States", International Seminar 
on Economic Co-operation in Africa, University College, Nairobi, December
1965.4 u ry^  , Vv \ tr f *‘v ‘ '■ . ■
v* fl r jp
See S. Kuznets, "Level and Structure of Foreign Trade : Comparisons for 
Recent Years", Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1964, 
esp. pp. 22-23 and B, Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth. 
Free Press, Glencoe, I960 for fuller discussions of this point.
*** See H. Myint, "An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness", op cit. and 
"The Gains from Trade", op cit, for fuller exposition of these aspects.
Cameroun exports are 83% directed to five markets and 95% to ten.
For imports the figures are 76% for five sources and 89% for ten. The average 
economic size of "the Cameroun’s trading partners (weighted by their share in 
exports or imports) is 130 times that of the Cameroun for exports and for 
imports alike. Even these figures understate the extent of Cameroun bargain­
ing weakness. A major supplier of no commodity, she is de facto limited in 
choice of markets by preferential E.E.C. duties integrally tied both to her 
supplying preferred markets for (often high cost)* French and E.E.C. exports 
and to her hopes of substantial capital transfers from France-F.E.D.-West 
Germany (81% of recent aid commitments). A further reinforcing factor is 
commercial institutional dominance by French firms whose preferential (parallel 
to other E.E.C.) treatment is guaranteed under the Yaounde Convention.
Lack of resource flexibility in use has already been noted in 
comparing import-production and export-use patterns. In the case of exports 
it is underlined by the fact that 96% of all export earnings are provided by 
ten commodities - 80% by five - of which at most two had substantial domestic 
markets in 1962-63.
Cameroun net domestic investment is approximately 80% dependent on 
foreign savings transfers. For the Administration sector this can be seen by 
comparing public revenue allocations to the capital budget with Administration 
investment. For the private and autonomous corporation sector (including 
tree crops but excluding traditional housing) exact data are not available 
but the autonomous corporations, e.g. TRANSCAM, do not generate sig­
nificant surpluses available for new investment and, outside tree crops, the 
overwhelming majority of private investment is by foreign owned firms whose 
decision to reinvest or remit is - at present - beyond Cameroun control.
Foreign capital aid comes 78% from two partially linked sources and 
98% from five. The average weighted economic size of aid suppliers, vis-a-vis. 
the Cameroun is 325:1. Given their limited number, massive size advantage, 
and 80% share in administrative and probably 90% share in autonomous state 
corporation investment - it is clear that while Cameroun public sector develop­
ment plans and projects can be, and increasingly are being, proposed in Yaounde 
and Douala, they are still ultimately disposed in Paris and Brussels. Private 
capitalKcomel almost entirely from France (economic size ratio about 120:1) 
and dominantly from corporate groups whose annual turnover exceeds Cameroun 
G.D.P. and whose flexibility in project location and therefore ability to 
extract favourable terms is high.
Perhaps one third of Cameroun high level manpower requirements are 
met by Cameroun nationals. At a 6-7-g% rate of G.D.P. growth even 1965 output 
could barely keep pace with new posts and Camerounian retirements without 
replacing expatriates. Of the foreign personnel, 80-85% come from one state 
and 90-92% from four. The quarter who are personnel aid appointees are only 
slightly less concentrated with 78% from one state and 89% from two.
Quite clearly the Cameroun Federal Republic’s degree of economic 
sovereignty or autonomy (not synonomous with autarchy) is extremely limited. 
Exogenous market and policy forces are far more critical than endogenous, the_ 
major .economic-.-decisions affecting the development of the Cameroun economy 
either are taken outside the state or can be implemented only subject to 
external approval leading to resource transfers both of capital and manpower. 
The degree of economic dependence of the Cameroun is such as to justify the 
term ''satellite" or "neo-colonial". With very limited bargaining power - 
related both to her economic lack of size and flexibility and to her limited
cf. F. Bloch-baine, La Zone Franc. -Presses Universitaires de France, 1956 
for data on these differentials which appear to have averaged at least 
10% and much higher on consumer durables, construction inputs, and 
machinery-transport equipment.
array of external economic partners - the Cameroun finds it difficult and 
expensive to secure support for her development and often de facto must bar­
gain in terms involving her international political and economic position 
within international organisations.*
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* An example would appear to be Cameroun support for the French "Cru"
proposals. Their negative impact on international liquidity and inten­
sification of balance of payments strains could only add to Cameroun 
difficulties in securing needed resource transfers, especially from 
either the United Kingdom or United States. For an extended discussion 
of economic and political dominance and dependence on the international 
policy and programme level see G. Lagos, International Stratification 
and Underdeveloped Countries. University of North Carolina, 1963.
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V. The Evolution of Economic Development and Planning Strategy
Neither planning nor a government strategy for economic growth 
is a recent innovation in the Cameroun Republic. However, the attempt to 
establish comprehensive national planning and to formulate an economic 
strategy aimed toward development of the Camerounian economy as a separate 
unit (as opposed to a segment of the France - Outre Mer& economic unit) 
did not begin seriously.before (East) Cameroun independence in I960.
French economic policy in the Camerounf - as indeed most African 
colonial economies - was neither strictly laissez faire nor pro-competi­
tion.* The mise en valeur strategy involved use of administrative and 
fiscal coercion as well as transport routes and law and order to raise 
Camerounian exports and revenues. Private sector policy involved agree­
ments - including concessions for forestry and plantations - with large ^ 
private units, especially the members of the SOCA and CFAC groups. * 
Tariff, concession, and administrative policy were designed to favour 
French investment and trade connections - even more in the 1945-1960 
period than in the inter-war years.*** In the 1930's, 60-65% of exports 
went to France and 30% of imports came from France; by 1949 the percen­
tages were 77 and 73.
The general lines of Camerounian growth were, to this extent, 
planned but as part of the French economy. Basic decisions for both the 
public expenditure programme and the private investment projects were 
taken in;and finance supplied from,France. After 1945 this pattern was 
formalized through the French plannification structure which included an 
overseas territory committee made up of French officials, business execu­
tives, Unionists, and independent economists. Expenditure levels were
* Cf. E.V. Berg "Socialism and Development in Tropical Africa",
Quarterly Journal of Economics  ^ November 1964, for a fuller develop­
ment of this theme.
** Cf. V. Thompson and R. Adloff, French West Africa, Stanford, 1958;
and Thompson, The Emerging States of French A -uatorial Africa,
Stanford, I960, pfluSsllHl for details of these groups' ramifications.
*** On the one hand League Mandate rules tended to limit overt discrim­
ination against non-French imports before World War II while on the
other France's post-war payments position made limitation of non- 
Franc zone imports a priority. The 1945 Free devaluation-which 
fixed the French African francs as equal to 2 rench francs when 1s1 
would have been a more plausible purchasing p vrr parity for imports*-" 
played a substantial role in trade redirection as did central control 
over Franc zone foreign exchange.
Cf. M . Leduc Les Institutions Monetai;as A fr A es ; Pays Franco­
phone „ Redone, Paris, 1965, Chapitre II.
3  s. f v> > c ■€, e, 1 1 4 w  *  J F r  i * t Uv "Hv > j ^  nT/flwi’ f  u
W a j  4 *  t e  t y p ^ c - p a J ,  $ 0 ^ \J L^'b
CKr d s » ^  \\ c< r \ y  V t, r  y j  civ L d +~ 11! o  / ^
f K  t i r  i -x + e ll t  o+o' *~l a  in J  C ^ J  *-f> -
0 ( 0 * .  *. ,. T ^ * ~ j  Ji A f t r  > <« ^  U\J l r\
o ra rvv  ^ o re  p * J i c^l Frdncl^ .1 ± F +
C 4 U o 11 c  u n i y trs i 4^ 4k > o A-1 £y.__o~r\ J
p / t i ^ l i  * I nJ^eJ -f Ke £ * t/'O ^'v a J+fi-*~i i * ^  )
j—  p ^ r * f  1^ k e - 6 .  a o j c  4 k c  <Z# r, i'frcK c f  i / ’^ f  iV{^
I V-v-v^ n n r v t  <£t p  f v  J <\ ^  < 2 ^ * /  ^ y l  £ - C  F  i tfc-v’ <^
k  ^ no k v v "v£. O f'' p / <£ *) —  ~bt^J £
/ o n o y #*-.4 ^p' &
CJo ) t r ~f& Fr Crlv & PP i C i * -1 i  L\, r*. F I ^ c^
f k  ol ^  “(rke- 4 k ©  ''J CL & - J *  / j o  r  j
d  ^  Ft? t. /ve.r\<? t r o r * ~ ~
w U ^ ,  j + k A y  i f < W /  F r t r v t U ,  / W * ;  W - _ _
L t>K t a i #4 \/ i ) o r j  & rwj W r  •' -fv i t  *Xru
r \ o i \ d d ^ ] ^ \ y  <X ^ S ty\ "f jp k y $ / C*. I 1^ ^  * J t ^
4- t r  *nry»x  ^ 6 p  3 / y r> t P / p  aLa_4— I A P I *L is£i  Q * y
C K\r*v^ tS  O v/*ni H  x»y jp /jPL m o /  /l.JS^_________
o  f ( 0 }  + »  H — +  © F' M  ^  \ I o r  I k n  u  J fiu
A  «^V y I O C t^ CsluJl V N* r Pi\0* p\ trv^ I C*t *v^
j  i f  ^ p c.£,__ 'K c  JE ^ Js a A  l^ < ~ {
o r  i ^  E ^ i  ^ ^  is o >j w  * )  # - l $ o
n d j  11 y Ik  tz. c>/N +  i / / 5 L S~* E c ^ > ^ ©^v^; c,
0 O inr^ \ <tvv*n i i  j |  Q «•"%, Pdn A f"  ^i C A  ^ &\r\ "f" ^  Av I A * C f<w
fl 1 i 1 > _ A  *v<s^  S M  I S i ^ J 4"
C < v ^ r v t / o y n —  f L C A  C w - \ + « e ^ 4 3  K>v\ #.r k  4 ^ C
F * > 5+  rv "f-1 ^  C /^>n d 1/  C ^ Htr ^  ••V-Vs «k
6eu/<Svt| | 4 J ) P  O p  O  0 n  - F r d y \  C-U^
p U  n n ;‘-V v__ C jc f> d ^ l t/i c c  r> k| u  e i #
E  C  f\ J  0 P  c . 0  / ^  r > 0  * 4  »-v /^ r\ y fo ~ S *y  O n*,
)r?c> )  y  d\f K'fs* \ O C  I t ^  A n ^ /a y> Ft* i L /k P  r ; 6a n ^
i 'HrxWV i#  4’ "H^r C C © rvv^ x i c Id k c Ja >«•
o  P  ^  S  ^ t  > - f  a.*\i i * I r>*\+~j os ; Fy oF
ifi b  IfK ^ ! A ” ft*J*.A'Yy& ' u *' & r +1 ' -hr O ef i f .iTy Xe, *
y \
raised (in both the public and the private sectors). Three limitations 
characterized this post-war, pre-independence planning:
CO r\
(l) No overall macro Y^iwte^were aetir nor was any structural analysis of 
the economy conducted on which to base a co-ordinated macro-plan;
(2)
(3)
Project selection was jtwwhmore explicitly in terms of Franc zone 
current interests - especially easing of France's foreign exchange 
stringency - not long term territorial development;
(Crtfci e^ \j
Planning - and especially the^decentralized consultation with all 
major governmental, private, and academic decision makers and 
suppliers of data - was carried out in France.
British economic policy in the West Cameroons was far less 
interventionist. Indeed until 1945 it would be hard to discern any 
concerted policy. The seized plantations were sold either to their old 
German owners or to the major British African groups (e.g. UAC, Holt, 
Elders) who also took over import-export trade and shipping. Imperial 
preference did provide effective protection for Cameroons1 bananas but 
was pMHbatoly raarc specifically intended to benefit West Indian producers 
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While the Cameroon Development Corporation emerged as the 
leading plantation producer after 1945, this resulted not from any real 
initiative but the 1939 reseizure of German holdings. An autonomous body, 
the CDC played little overall development role, failing even to expand 
output substantially in its own sector* which fell behind smallholder 
totals in export generation during the 1950's. While government expendi­
ture on development rose, the approach remained an extreme example of the 
government department "shopping list" plan and - compared either to 
Nigeria or to th§? French Came^oun - the level of effort remained low.
<j r\ <} C v •
Initially Camerounian national development strategy - as well 
as approaches to planning and to institution creation - was dominated by 
official French thinking and in particular by the conception of "animation 
rurale'1 via "invetissment humain" as the high road to rapid, broadly’
based development^'concentrated on export agriculture .^Public sector
dominance, except in agriculture, industries and mines, continued the 
French policy?adopted faute de mieux in the absence of substantial private 
capital interest (except for the Edea complex) or of locally owned 
savings.
Direct labour investment - in transport and public works as well 
as in massive agricultural renovation - was supposed to provide up to a
O'■A'
third of the investment during a 1960-i980 doubling of per capita income. 
This concept of "animation rurale" - which despite its use in underpinning 
certain Malian and Guinean ideological concepts iW1/4-to French agricul-
1 fitural civil servants***- springs on the one hand rom the historic pattern 
of direct "labour tax" (corvee) construction, and on the other from a 
reaction toward widely based agricultural education and extension and
4 **
This judgement on the CDC may be too harsh. It has taken steps to 
diversify out of bananas into oil palms and other crops more suitable 
to capital, and management intensive production. The plantation sector 
is therefore on a rather sounder basis than a decade ago.
Cf. S. Amin, Trois Experiences Africaines de Developpement : Le Mali.
La Guinee. et Le Ghana, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris,
1965; and R. Dumont, L ;Afrioue Noire Est Mai Parti, op. cit for 
more detailed exposition and critiques.
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away from capital (and deficit) intensive state projectsK(e.g.
Office du Niger, Richard Toll in Mali and Senegal). Attempted on a grand
scale in virtually every ex-French African territory, has had limited
local successes but consistently failed to generate broadly based agri- -j ■ v ~
cultural advance or - except in Guinea and Mali - much voluntary labour ' '
for community and local public works and communications.* f O c 1 '
' ' ' : itThe concept of a mass attack on rural stagnation^mobilizift-igi o 
labour time otherwise not economically useable and identification of 
extension and education as critical to this process are valid. However, 
a series of major conceptual and procedural errors have limited implemen­
tation, especially in the Cameroun Republic:**
(1) the need for considering production changes in the context of 
total rural socio-political institutional patterns and of their 
alteration was ignored, or at least underestimated;
(2) the absolute requirement of mass understanding of and enthusiasm
for any programme based on local action to succeed was never faced;***
(3) The degree to which direct labour could be used effectively without
intensive technical and monetary capital support was overestimated.
lrvy\( / 0 V ™  P'fLr^
As a result, the "animation rurale" programme has proven
grandiose and impracticable and a new rural development strategy based on
The contrasting of "animation rurale" and "community development" 
is instructive. These are not - as is sometimes assumed - simply 
French and British titles for the same programme. "Animation 
rurale" places primary emphasis on economic advance and on supplying 
technical personnel and activity oriented rural training to achieve 
it. "Community development" stresses community fulfilment of felt 
local needs especially for health, education, road and recreation 
facilities through mass based action backed by attitude and idea 
oriented education and some central personnel and funds. Each 
appears to be weak in the other's fields of strength with "animation 
rurale" more clearly identifying the importance of local action to 
raise productivity and "community development" more clearly centering 
on the need to secure mass enthusiasm and participation.
** See Bulletin Trimestriel O' Information. No. 4, June 1964, Part I, 
especially pages 11, 15-16, and Part III. (Direction du Plan et 
de la Co-operation Technique, Ministere des Finances et du Plan).
Community Development in the West Cameroon has apparently been more
successful within its more modest focus. It has & substantial ianv
<0 local support in many areas but its concentration on road building
appears to lack a sufficient base of studies and personnel to ensure
that only roads of adequate quality and real economic value are ,
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*** This problem is particularly critical in the southern areas where 
- qtT) acceptance of the government and of me iS not necessarily indic- 
atTve oTThe^support needed to ensure effective participation in 
government proposed schemes. In some areas e.g. Bamileke, Bassa 
much of Nyong et Sanaga, the dominant attitudes appear to be hostility 
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administrative and land reform, intensive "vulgarization"* and agro­
training, and depth concentration of personnel and funds on selected areas 
has been developed for the Second (1966-71) Plan period.,**
Independent Camerounian development strategy has evolved away 
from the French Colonial model in several other respects. The caution - 
not unrelated to the fact of concentrated Camerounian economic dependence 
on France discussed Cfcfla.f® li - with which strategy has been altered and 
the continuation of certain key elements - "opening up" the interior, the 
Transcam, economic regionalism -• tend to blur the real extent of the 
changes. ,
k,\ ^ T' o f € *-* *
Perhaps most important is the basic fact thal ^Camerounian 
development strategy is^seen as a way of attaining Camerounian socio­
political goals and is centered on the Cameroun Republic, whereas French 
Camerounian development strategy was ultimately concerned with the economic 
and political interests of France and of the Fianc Zone. The change in 
outlook is basic because it renders rapid development imperative and 
Camerounian interests paramount, at least to the extent they can be 
attained, when these clash with those of other states or foreign economic 
interests.*** I ~=r~> ^ u
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The^shift from basic pessimism to determined (but reasoned) 
optimism on the role of industry (cf. VIII below) springs in part at 
least from this change in outlook. Heavily influenced by French writings 
V- X on development as a process of change in the structure of production with 
a central role given to industrial expansion**** Camerounian official 
economic thinking has caftoent,r-ated on maximizing industrial opportunity 
through tax incentives, regional market broadening, and increasing ease
"Vulgarization", in this context, refers to formulation and presen­
tation of programmes on a level and in a way designed to secure 
popular understanding, commitment, and support. The aim is to 
provide concrete appreciation of how government programmes will - 
if attained - benefit the particular groups of people to whom 
"vulgarization" is addressed and to demonstrate the need for their 
-x- v active participation in the programme if the benefits are to result.
>,!■ The mass public relations, local contact, and particular context
x appreciation required are very different from those of plan formu­
lation and presentation - even in the of broad leadership
official-unofficial, working , Not surprisingly, there­
fore, plan body success in "vulgarization" is usually low in Africa 
j,s-* unless effective participation by popular mass parties, community
cj ’J development and extension personnel, and accepted local leaders,
has been enlisted.
** Cf. Bulletin 4, op cit. Part III. Here as elsewhere in the report 
the essential role of "vulgarization" is stressed.
*** Cf.- F.X.Sutton, "Planning and Rationality in the Newly Independent
States in Africa", Economic Development and Cultural Change,
October 1961, on the nature of this change.
**** Cf. F. Perroux, L ’Economie des jeunes nations, Presses Universitaires 
de France, Paris, 1962.; D. de Bernis et al, Industrialisation au 
Mahgreb, Maspero, Paris, 1963; R. Aron, Dix-huit lecons sur la 
societe industrielle, Gallimard, 1963, as examples of this outlook.
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of access to raw materials^regarding the question "Should we promote 
industry on a broad front?" as rhetorical.*
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Closely interlocked is a reduction in the degree of emphasis to 
be placed on export agriculture. The problem of price trends** and of 
quotas, e.g. coffee, combined with the EEC's policy of scaling down the 
preference for Associate crops and phasing out the former French price 
subsidization reinforcing the growing belief that additional dynamic 
sectors must be sought, Within the primary sector added stress is now 
placed on expanding the share of output, e.g. timber, cocoa, processed 
before export and of additional raw material and food production limited 
to domestic or regional market industrial and food processing plans.
Similarly the strategic role of the Transcam and of regional 
economic co-ordination are seen in a broader focus emphasizing commercial 
and industrial expansion in the Cameroun Republic based on regional markets 
and the integrating of the interior Cameroun into the national economy in 
addition to the long-standing import-export expansion and cost reduction 
roles of the Transcam and customs union as seen in "mise en valeur" terms.
Finally, the Cameroun Republic has - rather tentatively and 
cautiously - sought to broaden its international economic contacts as 
part of the process of increasing effective Camerounian control over 
economic decision making. The addition of EEC and FED to France and FAC - 
whatever its more general effects and implications - is seen as a step 
in this direction and has been followed up by greater trade with the "5" 
and by seeking (with some success)'West German loans. The USA and the 
IBRD (which is viewed as an Anglo-Saxon body) have also been approached.
US resource supply, especially in the context of Transcam 
financing and of personnel for West Cameroon educational expansion, has 
become significant. The UK's very limited continuing assistance and 
ending of trade preference to the West Cameroon has been a distinct dis­
appointment in terms of the broader economic contact strategy as well as 
in loss of resources and markets.
The main elements of present Camerounian development strategy 
can be summed up under headings:
(1) Creation of a more nationally integrated Camerounian economy with 
lower relative dependence on primary exports and greater national 
control over economic decisions and forces;
(2) Encouragement of industrial development on a broad front linked to 
increased processing of exports and national production of agricul­
tural raw material imports;
(3) Construction of the Transcam as a multi-purpose means to national 
and regional economic integration including expansion of effective 
industrial market size;
See Revue, UAM-OAMCE, 1962-1964 for various articles on planning and
on industrialization expressing this point of view. The views of
Pere Lebret - who has visited the Cameroun - and his school appear 
to have been influential in the short lived UAM-OAMCE secretariat 
burst of economic development strategy formulation and preplanning.
See e.g. "La Degredation Des Cours Mondiaux Des Produits Tropicaux - 
Son Incidence Sur Le Developpement Economique Du Cameroun", Bulletin 
de la Statistique Generale, March 1961, Ministere de L'Economie
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